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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature highlighting the cost of education-occupation mismatch
in the labor market. Most of the existing literature analyzing the education-occupation mismatch
has been focused on the developed economies. Using the Skill Towards Employment and Produc-
tivity (STEP) data, this paper analyzes the loss in income as a result of the education-occupation
mismatch in developing countries. The results suggest that vertically mismatched (over-educated
as well as under-educated) workers earn significantly less than the ”matched” workers, whereas
there is no significant penalty for being a horizontally mismatched workers. This paper also found
the over-educated and horizontally mismatched workers to be significantly less satisfied with their
life as compared to the ”matched”.
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1 Introduction
The role of education in economic development of a society has been well-established result in the
literature. Since the pioneering work of Schultz, Becker and Mincer, there has been many articles
highlighting the returns to education, resulting from improved human capital1, schooling quality2
and highlights the role of experience in partially explaining the gender gap in wages 3. In the last
two decades, the focus has been shifted more towards the heterogeneity in the returns to education
as a result of education-occupation mismatch. The mismatch between education and occupation
can be classified into two categories i.e. vertical mismatch and horizontal mismatch. A vertical
mismatch is defined as the over-education or under-education of the worker as compared to the
occupation’s required level. A horizontal mismatch would be defined as a mismatch between the
type of skills acquired during the school and the one required by the occupation.
There have been many studies analyzing the implication of vertical mismatch (over-education
or under-education) in the labor markets resulting in lost earnings in the developed economies.4
Most of them found the returns to over-education to be about one-third to two-third less as com-
pared to required level of schooling whereas the cost of under-education to be insignificant or
relatively smaller in the developed countries. Recently, the focus has been shifted to the horizon-
tal mismatch in the developed economies5. These studies found that the horizontally mismatched
workers earn around 5% to 20% less as compared to the matched workers.
There has not been many studies focusing on the developing countries, primarily because of the
1Mincer (1974), Psachoropoulus (1981), Willis (1986), Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), Ashenfelter and Rouse
(1998)
2See Behrman and Birdsall (1983) and Card and Krueger (1992).
3See Mincer and Polachek (1974)
4Sloane, Battu & Seaman (1999), Bourdet & Persson (2008), Dolton & Vignoles (2000), Hartog (2000), McGuin-
ness (2006), Rubb (2003)
5see Robst (2007a), Robst (2008), Nordin et al. (2010), Altonji et al. (2015), Lemieux (2014)
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lack of availability of the data. Quinn & Rubb (2005) analyzed the vertical mismatch inMexico and
found that the returns for extra schooling for over-educated males were half the returns for males
with required education. Mehta et al. (2011) assessed the implications for Philippines, Mexico,
India and Thailand and found varying level of evidence of over-education in unskilled jobs in
these economies. As many policymakers stress the importance of increasing the literacy rates in
developing world, it is important to highlight the implications of resulting education-occupation
mismatches in these economies. On one hand, the lower level of literacy rates might suggest that
under-education, rather than over-education, might be a critical issue in developing economies. On
the other hand, Obiols-Homs and Sanchez-Marcos (2018) have shown that the quality of education
is negatively correlated to the over-education in EU-15. Since the quality of education is relatively
worse in developing economies, it might lead to severe over-education in low and middle income
countries.
Using the data for 11 developing economies around the world, this paper will provide more
comprehensive support for existence of vertical and horizontal mismatch in the developing coun-
tries. It will also help us to compare the extent and implication of education-occupation mis-
match across these countries since STEP survey is a standardized household survey conducted
by The World Bank in these economies. The results suggest that over-educated workers (verti-
cal mismatch) earn 8%-15% less whereas horizontal mismatched workers earn less, though not
significantly, in income as compared to the workers who are neither vertically nor horizontally
mismatched in terms of their education and occupation. The workers who report themselves to
be under-educated earn more than their peers, having the same level of education, however, if the
premium for an extra level of education is incorporated, there is also a penalty for being under-
educated for their job.
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This paper also analyzes the relationship between this vertical as well as horizontal mismatch
and the life satisfaction of the workers. Since the workers invest a significant amount of money and
effort in achieving a certain level of education, but if they cannot utilize it in the labor market, it
might lead to not only lost income but also regret/dissatisfaction for life. Using the standard mea-
sure for life satisfaction, it has been found that the over-educated workers as well as horizontally
mismatched workers are significantly less satisfied, especially having secondary or higher level
of education, as compared to the workers who are employed with the required level and type of
education. Under-educated workers also report lower level of life satisfaction, however, the results
are not significant for these workers.
Rest of the paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 will discuss in detail the STEP data.
Section 3 will provide the description of the summary statistics and presents results. Finally,
section 4 will conclude.
2 Data
This paper will primarily use the Skill Towards Employment and Productivity (STEP) survey, a se-
ries of cross-sectional surveys conducted by World Bank in developing countries (low and middle
income countries) to assess the supply and demand of skills in the respective labor markets. STEP
includes an Employer survey to assess the demand for skills, and a Household survey to determine
the supply of skills in the labor market. The STEP Household survey collects detailed information
about the individual including demographics, educational background, type of employment, cog-
nitive skills, job-related skills and personality traits. For some of these countries, it also involves a
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literacy test for each individual at the end of the survey6.
STEP Household surveys was conducted for 11 countries in first two waves7. All the respon-
dents in the survey are between 15 and 64 years of age. STEP survey interview between 2000 and
4000 individuals, from randomly chosen households, in the urban areas of the country, to generate
a representative sample of the country. It collects detailed information about the household and the
the assets owned by it including the number of cattle, radio, television, size of the house, source of
energy etc.
For a randomly chosen adult in the household, it collects detailed information about the level
and the field of education (in school or some vocational center), basic information about the in-
dividual’s health (including the life satisfaction), personality traits and risk preferences as well as
family related information. For the employed individuals, it will collect detailed information about
the job as well as the tasks performed at work. For this paper, we will restrict the age of workers to
be between 20 and 64 years old8. This paper will focus on the employed individuals in the STEP
survey since it is focused on the implications of education-occupation mismatch in the job market.
3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the statistics across participating countries. There are 4 countries from Asia,
3 from Eastern Europe, 2 from Africa and 2 from South America. The number of observa-
tions(employed individuals) varies across countries with Kenya having the highest number of ob-
6See Pierre et al. (2014) for a detailed description of the skills measures included in the STEP surveys
7Ukraine is excluded from the sample as the required variables used in the survey are different from other countries
8The results in this paper are robust to the inclusion of all workers i.e. 15 to 64 years old or 20 to 60 years old. We
have restricted the starting age to be 20 years as by then, the workers should have atleast completed their secondary
school which is the minimum education level for horizontal mismatch in this paper
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servations and Georgia having the least9. Interestingly, Eastern European countries and Yunnan
have relatively lower level of self-employment as compared to other countries10. The next column
lists the variation in hourly median wage rate across countries which is in accordance with the GDP
per capita across these countries.Column (5) and (6) highlights the years and level of educational
attainment. It should be noted that more years of education does not always translate into higher
level of education.
The last four columns gives information about the level of education-occupation mismatch
across these countries. In order to define whether the worker is vertically mismatched, this paper
uses the self-reported information considering the presence of bias towards self-reported over-
education issue. The STEP survey records the highest level of education completed by the indi-
vidual. In addition, it also asks the workers to report the minimum level of education, according to
their opinion, required to perform their job. This paper classify the education into 9 ISCED levels,
comparable across countries11. If there is a difference of 2 levels between the individual’s own edu-
cation and the required education for the job, she will be classified as vertically mismatched i.e. an
individual will be over-educated (under-educated) if her own education is 2 levels higher (lower)
than the one required for her job12. The difference of two levels has been chosen as a benchmark in
order to correct the worker’s bias towards classifying herself as over-educated. Interestingly, con-
trary to the expectation, most of these developing countries have an issue of over-education which
might suggest that the quality of education is relatively lower in these economies. Laos, being the
9These observations only include the employed workers who are earning some positive salary for their work. It
does not include the workers who might be employed but do not receive any salary or benefits
10Most of these self-employed are in Services and Sales occupation which might suggest that they operate a small
shop/store
11ISCED level are No Education or Less than Primary, Primary, Basic General, Secondary General, Post-secondary
(specialized/vocational, Bachelors (4 years), Masters, Candidate of Science and Doctor of Science.
12The results are robust at the difference of 3 levels of education as well
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only exception, reporting under-education to be more prevalent as compared to over-education in
the labor market. Last two columns record the horizontal mismatch. The STEP survey does not
have enough data to directly measure the horizontal mismatch. Though, it does ask the respondent
to rate the usefulness of her education for her work. The respondent can respond by choosing, very
useful, moderately useful, somewhat useful and not useful at all. A worker will be considered hor-
izontally mismatched if she has atleast secondary level of education and is neither under-educated
nor over-educated, but still reports her studies to be not useful for her job. A strong mismatch is
a horizontal mismatch where the worker reports that her studies were not useful at all for her job
whereas a weak mismatch would be where the education is either not useful at all (strong mis-
match) or somewhat useful for work. Table 1 suggests that the proportion of workers reporting
a strong horizontal mismatch varies between nearly nothing to 16 percent and correspondingly,
relatively higher level of weak mismatch. Laos has the lowest level of literacy but also reports the
lowest level of education-occupation mismatch whereas Kenya also has a lower level of education
in general but reports very high level of over-education.
Table 2 and 3 record the distribution of workers across major occupations and major industries
respectively. Since STEP survey is conducted in the urban areas, there are relatively fewer workers
(except Laos) than expected in Skilled Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing among major occupation
codes as well as Agriculture, Forestry and Mining among major industry groups despite these
economies to be agrarian in nature. Most of the workers are employed in the other services among
the major industry group. Services and Sales workers employ most of the workers among the
major occupation groups. In Eastern European countries, Professionals also employ a significant
proportion (22% to 35%) of the total workforce.
The distribution of educational level across workers is provided by Table 4. This paper uses the
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CSO Standard Educational Classification, jointly introduced by Eurostat and UNESCO, based on
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997). It is also used by STEP survey
to record the educational field for the highest level of education completed by the individual. As
mentioned earlier, Eastern European countries and Yunnan province have relatively higher level of
education among their workforce irrespective of the level of development.
There are also 10 major field of studies (including the others category). Table 5 reports the
distribution of workers across field of study having atleast secondary level of education. Most of
the earlier reported studies have chosen college and above for analyzing the impact of horizontal
mismatch on earnings in developed economies. This paper chose the secondary and above since
there exists variation across field of study even at the secondary level as is evident from Table 5. It
leaves us with 11,579 observations.
Table 5 highlights that women dominate men in Education, Humanities & Arts, Health &
Welfare whereas men are somewhat over-represented in Engineering, Manufacturing & Construc-
tion, Agriculture & Veterinary and Services. Table 5 also records the distribution of fields across
different level of education. As expected, more than half of the workers with secondary level of
education have degrees in General Programmes. However, among the college graduates and work-
ers with the Masters degree, most of the workers have a degree in Engineering, Manufacturing &
Construction.
Last 4 rows in Table 5 shows the distribution of usefulness of education for each field. It can be
seen that nearly one-third of the workers with General Programmes degree report their education
to be not useful at all or just somewhat useful whereas less than 17 percent of the workers with
Education or Health & Welfare degree reported similar levels of usefulness of their education.
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4 Education Occupation Mismatch
In standard human capital models, an individual acquires education to enhance the future earnings.
She would choose the level and type of education which would maximize her expected earnings
given her risk preferences as well as job characteristics. However, the dispersion in returns to
education exists at every level of education, primarily, resulting from the education-occupation
mismatch in the labor market as first pointed out by Duncan and Hoffman (1981). Hartog (2000)
found the returns to actual years of schooling to be less than the returns to required years of school-
ing on the job, suggesting a penalty for being over-educated. Similarly, Robst (2007) also found
that even if the worker might have the right level of education, there is still significant heterogene-
ity among the the returns to a specific type (college major) of education. He found the mismatch
between the college major and the occupation to be the main source of this heterogeneity in re-
turns to the college majors in U.S. There have been many studies exploring the implications for
earnings as well as job satisfaction, as a result of vertical or horizontal mismatch in the developed
economies. There has also been few studies highlighting the issue of vertical mismatch in some
developing economies13. The developing countries, in general, are characterized by lower level of
education which might suggest that there might not be an issue of education occupation mismatch,
especially over-education, for the workers. On the other hand, Obiols-Homs and Sanchez-Marcos
(2018) has shown that the quality of education plays an important role in the over-education in the
labor market. Using the data from EU-15, they have shown that the quality of education appears to
be negatively correlated with both the over-education of workers at the tasks they perform and the
unemployment rate. Hence, it is important to understand the existing level of education-occupation
13see Quinn & Rubb (2006) and Mehta et. al(2011)
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mismatch in the developing countries and their implications for earnings, job satisfaction or even
migration decisions as suggested by Quinn and Rubb (2006).
This paper explores the issue of education-occupation mismatch among 11 developing coun-
tries in detail. We will use the self-reported measures to classify the mismatch in the labor market
which might be subjective in nature14. Though, it is subjective in nature, Groot and Maassen van
den Brink (2000),have shown that among different measures of over-education, only the one based
on variation in years of education within occupational groups appears to yield significantly lower-
than-average rates of over-education. The main advantage of the self-reported measure is that the
individual has the perfect information about her job as well as her own qualification.
Since in the developing countries, there is a higher probability of repeating the grades, so
years of education might not be the ideal measure to assess the acquired level of education. This
paper uses the level of formal education completed by the individual (irrespective of number of
years it took to complete) to measure the educational qualification. In order to control for the
bias in self-reported measure, this paper will characterize the mismatch at a difference of more
than two levels of education. In the STEP survey, a question asks, ”What is the highest level of
formal education you have completed?”. Another question asks, ”What is the minimum level of
education you think is required to do this job?”. These questions are used to classify the vertical
mismatch. The answers to the above question were converted to a standard ISCED classification
into 9 categories. If the actual level of education is atleast 2 levels above (below) the required level
of education, the worker will be classified as over-educated (under-educated). In addition, STEP
survey also asks ”How useful were your studies for this work?”. The respondent can choose one
14For detailed discussion on the methods to calculate education occupation mismatch, see Leuven and Oosterbeek
(2014)
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of the four options i.e. not useful at all, somewhat useful, moderately useful and very useful. This
usefulness variable helps us to define the horizontal mismatch for the individual worker. If the
worker is neither over-educated nor under-educated as defined above and still reports her studies
to be not useful at all or somewhat useful for her work and has atleast secondary education, she
will be classified as horizontally mismatched. Robst (2007) and Yeun (2010) also uses similar
questions from the U.S. National Survey College Graduates and the SLID to look at the impact of
relatedness on earnings whereas Lemieux (2014) and Nordin et al. (2010) measures the relatedness
at the occupation-field of study level for Canada and Sweden respectively. Nordin et al. (2010)
construct their own measure of horizontal mismatch by comparing the occupational and field of
studying classifications.
4.1 Education-Occupation Mismatch and Earnings
In order to assess the impact of mismatch on the earnings of the individual, we start with the
modified Mincerian wage equation with the corresponding fixed effects.
ln(wage) = β0+β1Female+β2educ+β3exp+exp
2 +β4O.E.+β5U.E.+β6H.M.+βxX+ǫ
(1)
where wage is the hourly wage rate in U.S. dollars, Female is the dummy for being a female,
educ is the ISCED level of education, exp and exp2 are the proxy for experience and experience
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square for the individual15. O.E. represents a dummy for being over-educated, U.E. is the dummy
for being under-educated and H.M. being the horizontal mismatch. X will be a set of variables
which will record the individual’s characteristics as well as job characteristics and the industry-
occupation-country fixed effects.
Table 6 presents the results for equation (1) with different controls. The mismatch measures
have been added incrementally to the regression from column (1) to column (4). Column (1) reports
the result for educational categories without controlling for the mismatch. As expected, there is an
incremental returns for the level of education completed by the worker in the labor market. There is
also a premium for experience in the job. On average, the individual earns 1.4 percent more for an
extra year of experience in the labor market. In column (2), only the measure for vertical mismatch
has been added. The workers who report themselves to be under-educated for their job earns about
12 percent more as compared to the workers with the same level of education but they report
themselves to be adequately matched. It seems like that these workers outperform their peers, in
terms of educational level, as they might be working in jobs that require higher level of education
and as a result have higher wages. On the other hand, if a worker is over-educated, she earns about
8 percent less as compared to the workers with similar level of education but do not find themselves
to be over-educated or under-educated. The coefficient for education at every level increases once
we control for the vertical mismatch for the individual. It might suggests that if we do not control
for the mismatch in education and occupation, the returns to education might be under-reported (or
biased downwards) as highlighted in the earlier literature. In column (3) and column (4), the results
also control for the strong and weak horizontal mismatch respectively. There is higher penalty for
15The proxy for experience is the difference between the current age and the age at which the individual completed
her education
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strong horizontal mismatch as compared to the weak horizontal mismatch, though the coefficients
for both are not significant. It might be because of the measurement issue as the definition of
horizontal mismatch used here is not as clear as used in earlier literature.
Table 6 also reports that females, on average, earns about 21 percent less as compared to their
male counterparts and there is heterogeneity among these countries in the level of unexplained
gender wage gap16.We can also notice that there is also a positive and significant premium for
height. The results for height are in line with Vogl (2014) for Mexico, though, the magnitude is
smaller, on average, for STEP countries. Among the big five personality traits, individuals scoring
higher on the consciousness, openness and emotional stability earn significantly higher wages.
There has been ample evidence in Psychology and Economics literature highlighting the impact of
personality traits on educational attainment, occupational choice or even their performance in the
workplace17. It can also be seen that there is a penalty about 22% for working in the informal sector
whereas a reward of about 15 percent for self-employed individuals in STEP countries which is in
the range found for other developing countries. Gindling et al. (2016) found a premium of about
25% for self-employed workers and a penalty of about 22% for workers in informal sector in urban
areas of low income countries.
In many earlier papers, the authors have tried to control for the endogeneity issue posed by
the ability of the workers. It might be possible that the mismatched workers in the market are
the ones who might have lower ability and it is the lower ability which might be causing the mis-
matched workers (over-educated or horizontally mismatched) to earn lower wages as compared to
the matched individuals. Given the data available, we have controlled for different proxies for the
16See appendix for country level regression for each of the 11 countries in the data.
17see Bowels et al. (2001), Nyhus and Pons (2005) and Groves (2005) for more details
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ability difference among the surveyed workers. We have already controlled for height which has
been reported to be a predictor of higher cognitive abilities among the workers. Case and Paxon
(2008) have shown that the taller individual perform significantly better on cognitive tests as com-
pared to shorter workers. We will also control for the self-reported performance of the worker
in the primary or secondary school. The survey asks the respondent ”From what you remember,
how did you compare in your school work to your classmates in the highest grade you attended in
primary or secondary school?”. The individual response is recorded as excellent, above average,
average, below average. Davis-Kean (2005) have shown that the parents educational level posi-
tively affect the student’s achievements through parental education itself, in addition to the higher
income level resulting from higher education of the parents. In column (6), we control for self-
reported student’s performance in school and maximum of the parents education level in addition
to the height of the individual. We notice that the coefficient for vertical as well as horizontal mis-
match are robust to the inclusion of these variables. In 7 of these 11 countries, STEP survey also
conducted the literacy test for each individual surveyed. In column (7), we have also controlled for
the literacy score in addition to the other proxies for the ability differential. The magnitude for the
vertical mismatch variables increases after controlling for the literacy score of the individuals, but
that is primarily because of the change in the sample size as shown by the results in column (8) for
these 7 countries without the literacy scores.
Table 7 runs similar regression as Table 6, though only for the workers having secondary or
higher level of education. It is important to analyze these workers as many developing countries
are characterized by lower level of education. In addition, horizontal mismatch is defined for the
workers with secondary or higher level of education. The premium for under-education is relatively
low whereas the penalty for over-education or horizontally mismatched workers is relatively higher
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for these workers as compared to the aggregate data. However, the coefficient is still insignificant
for the horizontal mismatch. The premium for height as well as being self-employed and the
penalty for being in the informal sector is also significantly higher for these workers. Column (5)
reports the regression results similar to column (4) with the field of study fixed effect. The results
for the mismatch variables are robust to controlling for the field of study effects as well as proxies
for the ability variable as suggested by column (6), (7) and (8).
Leuven and Osterbeek (2011) have summarized the results for the vertical mismatch from
many different studies, mostly focused on developed economies, and have found the returns for
over-schooling to be usually half (3%-4%) of the returns to the require level of schooling (7%-
9%) whereas a penalty of 2%-5% for every year of under-education. Quinn & Rubb (2006) found
similar results for Mexico. Our results are also in line with these numbers as the vertical mismatch
is defined at the difference of two ISCED level of education which usually translate into 3 to 6
years of education. It should be noted that the coefficient for under-education is positive, which
implies that these under-educated workers earn more than the workers with same level of education.
Though, it does not mean that it is a premium for being under-educated. If we compare the earnings
of under-educated worker with the worker having the right level of education, it shows that there is
also penalty for being under-educated as the premium for extra level of education is bigger than the
coefficient of under-education for any given ISCED level. For horizontal mismatch, the penalty for
college educated workers in developed economies range from 3% to more than 20%, the variation
resulting from the definition of horizontal mismatch, the demographic characteristics of the sample
and the country for the data-set18. The coefficient in our results are more modest and insignificant
in nature. It is possible that there is not a serious issue of horizontal mismatch in these developing
18see Robst (2007), Nordin et al. (2010) and Lemiux (2014)
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countries, though, the robustness of the results from developed economies might suggest the reason
to be the crude definition of the horizontal mismatch in this paper.
In the next section, we analyze the impact of this mismatch on the utility of the individual,
measured by the life satisfaction index.
4.2 Education-Occupation Mismatch and Life Satisfaction
For the working adults, job satisfaction is arguably the most important component of their life
satisfaction as an individual, on average, spends about a quarter of her time at work. As discussed
earlier, human capital models suggest that the individuals carefully choose the level and type of
education based on the expected future returns of the education in the labor market. Once the
individual enters the market and could not find the ”right” job for her level and type of education, it
might lead to disappointment/dissatisfaction. In this section, we want to see whether the education-
occupation mismatch has any relationship with the life satisfaction of the individual.
In the survey, the respondents are asked ”How satisfied are you at present with your life, all
things considered?” and the respondent can choose from a scale of 1 (completely dissatisfied) to
10 (completely satisfied). We start by regressing this life satisfaction measure with all the variables
in Table 6 including the log(wage), married, Have children and replacing experience with age and
age squared to control for other socio-economic variables which affect the life satisfaction of the
individual19. It can be seen that the workers who report themselves to be over-educated or hori-
zontally mismatched have lower life satisfaction, though, the coefficient of horizontal mismatch
are not significant. Column (5) controls for the relative asset position of the household within
the country as Easterlin (1995) suggests that the relative income level affects the life satisfaction
19see Stutzer and Frey (2006), Clark and Oswald (1996), Deaton (2008) and Angeles (2010) for more details.
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rather than the absolute level of income. It can be seen that the coefficient for mismatch are robust
to controlling for the social status of the family20.
The results for other variables are also in line with the literature. Table 8 suggests that a pos-
itive and significant relationship between life satisfaction and being female, married, education,
height, self-employed, big 5 personality traits (barring consciousness) and negative and significant
relationship between being parent, age, suffering from chronic disease and being employed in in-
formal sector of the economy. Other than the results for being parents (i.e. having children), the
sign for other variables are as expected from the literature21. Women, on average, report higher
level of satisfaction as compared to men across the world. Hartog $ Osterbeek (1998) has shown
that higher schooling affects the life satisfaction through health as well as income channel. More
educated workers are likely to get higher paying jobs and are also more careful about their health.
Both these variables have positive and significant relationship with life satisfaction. Blanchflower
and Oswald (2004) have shown that married individuals have more sex than single, divorced or
separated individuals and sexual activity has a strong relationship with the life satisfaction. How-
ever, Booth et al. (1985) have argued that the birth of the child have a negative correlation with the
marital happiness as having children reduces the probability of divorce among the unhappy couples
and it might cause the negative association with the life satisfaction. Height is a predictor for better
health as well as cognitive abilities and the taller workers, even in non-cognitive jobs, earn more.
This might explain the positive relationship between height and life satisfaction. Lange (2012)
have shown that even controlling for socio-economic and personality traits, self-employed work-
ers value their autonomy and procedural freedom and report higher job satisfaction as compared
20Interestingly, the coefficient of most of the education level becomes insignificant once the regression controls for
the relative position of the household on the asset index
21see Hartog & Osterbeek (1998), Deaton (2008), Andersson (2008)
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to the employees. The workers in the informal sector reports lower level of life satisfaction and
this relationship is very robust in nature. As the workers in the informal sector are not guaranteed
the labor rights by constitution, especially in developing countries, the dismal working conditions
might be the prime reason for lower level of satisfaction among these workers.
Table 9 presents the same regression as Table 8 but for the workers with secondary or higher
level of education as it is more meaningful to analyze the impact of horizontal mismatch among
these workers and compare it with the workers who do not report a mismatch. It can be noticed
that the workers reporting horizontal mismatch reports significantly lower level of life satisfaction.
The coefficient for under-education is also negative for these workers which might suggest that
these under-educated workers might feel their lower level of education as compared to their peers
to be an obstacle for promotion/growth. Even after controlling for the relative asset position of
the household in the country as in column (5) or for the field of education as n column (6), the
coefficient for weak horizontal mismatch is still significant.
It should be highlighted that there is no direct measure for job satisfaction in this survey, how-
ever, this robust negative relationship between education-occupation mismatch and the life sat-
isfaction in these developing countries points towards the job dissatisfaction channel. Country-
industry-occupation fixed effects control for any systematic variation that might be arising from
the differences in these categories and the socio-economic and demographic variables control for
the standard determinants of life satisfaction. Despite all these controls, the negative relation-
ship between mismatch variable and life satisfaction is robust. This second degree implications of
education-occupation mismatch, after the impact on the earnings, has not been studied in detail,
especially for the developing countries. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data-set as well
as crude measure for horizontal mismatch, this paper cannot comment on the causal relationship
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between education-occupation mismatch and life satisfaction. Though, this paper provides ample
evidence to explore this relationship in more detail.
5 Conclusion & Discussion
This paper contributes to the expanding list of empirical papers, focused on quantifying the impact
of education-occupation mismatch in the labor markets. Much of the earlier literature is focused
on the developed or upper-middle income countries. This paper assesses the penalty of vertical
as well as horizontal mismatch among the low or middle income countries22. The results suggest
that over-educated workers (vertical mismatch) earn 8%-15% less whereas horizontal mismatched
workers earn 0%-6% less in income as compared to the workers who are not over-educated or
horizontally mismatched in terms of their education and occupation, though the coefficient for
horizontal mismatch are insignificant. The workers who report themselves to be under-educated
for their jobs earn 8%-20% more money as compared to the workers with same education level but
do not report a mismatch. Though, once we account for the premium of extra level of education,
this under-education is penalized in the labor market. There is also a negative and significant
relationship between education-occupation mismatch and the life satisfaction of the worker. This
paper is the first to comment on the relationship between education occupation mismatch and the
life satisfaction for workers in the developing countries23.
Many policymakers stress on increasing the literacy rates in the developing countries. However,
this paper highlights the importance of incorporating the implications of education occupation mis-
22STEP countries including Armenia, Bolivia, Colombia, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Laos, Macedonia, Sri Lanka,
Viet Nam, Yunnan Province in China
23This statement is true to the best of my knowledge
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match in order to correctly assess the benefits of increasing literacy in developing countries. This
paper also highlights that despite the developing countries having lower level of education, there
is significant proportion of the workforce that reports themselves to be over-educated or do not
find their studies to be useful for work. It is important to explore whether these workers are over-
educated or find their studies to be useless because there are not many relevant job opportunities in
these areas or is it because the quality of education being provided in these countries is not good
enough to match these workers with the ”right” jobs in these economies. This paper also suggests
an extra cost of these mismatched in terms of lost utility (or satisfaction). Given the limitations
of the data, there cannot be any inference on the causal relationship between the mismatch in the
labor market and the life satisfaction. Though, it is important to determine the causality in this
relationship to correctly estimate the welfare effect of these mismatches.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics across Countries
Country Total Employed Self-
Employed
Median Wage Average
years of
Education
Median
ISCED
completed
Over-
Educated
Under-
Educated
Strongly
Mis-
matched
Weakly
Mis-
matched
Armenia 2992 963 .1 2.54 14.1 6 .22 .03 .07 .15
Bolivia 2433 1414 .48 2.98 11.4 4 .58 .06 .01 .04
Colombia 2617 1566 .45 2.76 10.2 3 .41 .01 .02 .06
Georgia 2996 887 .14 2.89 15.6 6 .68 .02 .04 .08
Ghana 2987 1925 .62 1.36 8.9 2 .38 .11 .01 .05
Kenya 3894 2159 .41 1.66 9.7 3 .51 .02 .01 .05
Laos 2845 1597 .61 1.7 8.6 2 .16 .19 0 .01
Macedonia 4009 1607 .16 4.46 13.3 3 .33 .14 .16 .23
Sri Lanka 2989 1323 .34 2.42 9.5 3 .26 .01 .01 .06
Vietnam 3405 2121 .39 2.74 11.2 3 .35 .02 .01 .07
Yunnan 2017 1216 .13 2.73 12.8 3 .09 .06 .02 .18
Notes: Table 1 provides summary statistics for the STEP survey across 11 countries. Here, employed individuals are the ones who are 20 years of
age or older and have a job/business that have positive earnings.Worker will be classified as over-educated (or under-educated) if she has atleast two
ISCED level of education higher (or lower) than the one required for this job. An individual will be classified as storngly mismatched (or weakly
mismatched) if she has atleast secondary level of education, is neither classified as over-educated or under-educated and still reports her education
to be not useful at all (not useful at all or somewhat useful) for her work.
Table 2: Distribution of Workers across Occupations
Country Armed
Forces
Managers Professionals Technicians
& Assoc.
Profs.
Clerical
Sup-
port
work-
ers
Services
and
Sales
Work-
ers
Skilled
Agri.,
Forest.
& Fish.
Craft &
Related
Trades
Plant &
Ma-
chinery
Opera-
tors
Elementary
Occu-
pations
Total
Armenia .02 .06 .35 .11 .09 .16 0 .06 .05 .09 963
Bolivia 0 .06 .13 .11 .05 .27 0 .18 .07 .11 1414
Colombia 0 .04 .08 .06 .09 .29 .16 .09 .19 1566
Georgia .01 .1 .34 .08 .06 .2 0 .07 .04 .09 887
Ghana .03 .12 .02 .02 .42 .07 .21 .05 .06 1925
Kenya 0 .02 .11 .06 .06 .46 .01 .12 .04 .12 2159
Laos .04 .04 .07 .05 .02 .26 .25 .12 .03 .12 1597
Macedonia .01 .06 .22 .13 .07 .19 .01 .13 .1 .09 1607
Sri Lanka .01 .07 .14 .04 .06 .13 .05 .21 .08 .22 1323
Vietnam .01 .04 .18 .06 .06 .34 .01 .15 .06 .09 2121
Yunnan .06 .15 .07 .18 .28 .02 .07 .07 .11 1216
Notes: Table 2 reports the distribution of employed adult workers across major occupation group. An employed adult worker is defined as atleast
20 years old and have a job/business that generates positive earnings.
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Table 3: Distribution of Workers across Industry
Country Agriculture,
Forestry and
Mining
Manufacturing
and
Construction
Commerce Other
Services
Total
Armenia .09 .12 .1 .7 963
Bolivia .01 .25 .24 .5 1414
Colombia .01 .24 .29 .46 1566
Georgia .02 .12 .13 .73 887
Ghana .09 .16 .38 .37 1925
Kenya .01 .16 .28 .55 2159
Laos .27 .18 .24 .31 1597
Macedonia .04 .24 .18 .54 1607
Sri Lanka .13 .3 .17 .4 1323
Vietnam .03 .25 .25 .47 2121
Yunnan .03 .16 .2 .61 1216
Notes: Table 3 reports the distribution of employed adult workers across major industry group. An employed adult worker is defined as atleast 20
years old and have a job/business that generates positive earnings.
Table 4: Distribution of Workers across level of Education
Country Less than
Primary
Primary
School
Middle
School
High
School
College &
above
Total
Armenia 0 0 .04 .26 .68 963
Bolivia .13 .05 .12 .39 .31 1414
Colombia .09 .22 .05 .36 .29 1566
Georgia 0 0 .02 .21 .75 887
Ghana .22 .1 .35 .2 .13 1925
Kenya .11 .22 .11 .43 .12 2159
Laos .22 .22 .18 .25 .14 1597
Macedonia 0 .01 .11 .56 .32 1607
Sri Lanka .08 .11 .29 .43 .1 1323
Vietnam .05 .15 .2 .29 .32 2121
Yunnan .01 .07 .28 .3 .34 1216
Notes: Table 4 reports the distribution of employed adult workers across major educational level as defined by ISCED. An employed adult worker
is defined as atleast 20 years old and have a job/business that generates positive earnings.
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Table 5: Distribution of Workers across Field of Study (Excluding the unpaid employees and having less than secondary level of
education)
Field of Study
General Education Humanities Social Science, Science, Maths Engineering, Agriculture Health Services Others Total
Programmes and Arts Business and Law and Computing Manufacturing and Veterinary and Welfare
and Construction
A. Percentage of Individuals in each field of study
All 28.1 4.2 3.2 9.2 2.6 16.1 2.1 5.9 8.9 19.7 100
Men 28.8 2.5 1.9 8.9 3.0 18.4 2.6 4.1 10.3 19.5 49.2
Women 27.5 5.8 4.4 9.5 2.3 13.9 1.6 7.5 7.6 19.9 50.8
Secondary 62.9 0.7 0.7 3.8 1.0 13.0 1.3 2.2 3.2 11.2 35.1
Post-secondary 22.8 3.1 2.3 5.3 1.6 11.4 1.2 5.8 8.8 37.7 25.0
Bachelors 0.8 3.4 2.6 11.5 2.7 25.3 3.2 9.1 17.2 24.2 19.9
Masters and Above 0.9 12.4 9.1 21.0 6.7 18.4 3.5 9.2 11.0 7.8 20.0
B. Percentage of individuals assessing the usefulness of education
Not useful 12.4 8.2 10.9 13.5 15.8 15.0 14.5 8.1 9.8 7.9 11.5
Somewhat useful 26.6 8.5 12.0 11.9 12.5 15.2 11.6 6.6 13.6 19.6 17.8
Moderately useful 23.2 12.2 10.3 18.9 14.1 20.8 19.5 11.8 17.9 23.4 20.1
Very useful 37.8 71.1 66.8 55.7 57.6 49.0 54.4 73.5 58.7 49.1 50.6
Notes: Table 5 highlights the distribution of workers across different educational fields. Here, we have focused on the workers who have atleast secondary level of education, are atleast 20 years or older
and have positive earnings from their job/business. In section A, the horizontal rows add upto 100% whereas in section B, the column adds upto 100%.
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Table 6: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES
Log (Hourly wages in USD)
Female -0.213(0.019)*** -0.209(0.019)*** -0.209(0.019)*** -0.209(0.019)*** -0.219(0.019)*** -0.223(0.024)*** -0.224(0.024)***
Primary Education -0.002(0.067) 0.018(0.067) 0.018(0.067) 0.018(0.067) 0.026(0.067) -0.005(0.091) 0.001(0.091)
Basic General 0.113(0.065)* 0.166(0.065)** 0.166(0.065)** 0.166(0.065)** 0.168(0.066)** 0.104(0.087) 0.127(0.087)
Secondary (General) 0.251(0.065)*** 0.310(0.066)*** 0.313(0.066)*** 0.312(0.066)*** 0.303(0.067)*** 0.336(0.089)*** 0.368(0.089)***
Post-secondary (specialized/vocational) 0.284(0.067)*** 0.372(0.068)*** 0.373(0.068)*** 0.372(0.068)*** 0.354(0.070)*** 0.303(0.091)*** 0.350(0.091)***
Bachelors (4 years) 0.458(0.068)*** 0.558(0.071)*** 0.559(0.071)*** 0.559(0.071)*** 0.526(0.072)*** 0.474(0.094)*** 0.521(0.093)***
Masters 0.748(0.073)*** 0.858(0.075)*** 0.858(0.075)*** 0.858(0.075)*** 0.806(0.077)*** 0.759(0.098)*** 0.814(0.097)***
Candidate of Science 0.891(0.086)*** 1.039(0.091)*** 1.039(0.091)*** 1.040(0.091)*** 0.977(0.092)*** 0.953(0.111)*** 1.005(0.110)***
Doctor of Science 1.197(0.179)*** 1.349(0.181)*** 1.349(0.181)*** 1.349(0.181)*** 1.286(0.181)*** 1.314(0.198)*** 1.362(0.197)***
Experience 0.014(0.002)*** 0.014(0.002)*** 0.014(0.002)*** 0.014(0.002)*** 0.015(0.002)*** 0.014(0.003)*** 0.013(0.003)***
Experience Squared -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)***
Height (in meters) 0.235(0.090)*** 0.236(0.090)*** 0.236(0.090)*** 0.236(0.090)*** 0.213(0.090)** 0.213(0.105)** 0.212(0.105)**
Chronic Illness -0.035(0.023) -0.035(0.023) -0.035(0.023) -0.035(0.023) -0.032(0.023) -0.054(0.029)* -0.053(0.029)*
Extraversion 0.031(0.013)** 0.031(0.013)** 0.031(0.013)** 0.031(0.013)** 0.029(0.013)** 0.024(0.016) 0.024(0.016)
Conscientiousness 0.046(0.016)*** 0.045(0.016)*** 0.045(0.016)*** 0.045(0.016)*** 0.043(0.016)*** 0.022(0.020) 0.025(0.020)
Openness 0.048(0.015)*** 0.045(0.015)*** 0.045(0.015)*** 0.045(0.015)*** 0.038(0.015)*** 0.048(0.019)*** 0.051(0.019)***
Agreeableness 0.012(0.014) 0.011(0.014) 0.011(0.014) 0.011(0.014) 0.011(0.014) -0.026(0.018) -0.026(0.018)
Emotional Stability 0.037(0.012)*** 0.037(0.012)*** 0.037(0.012)*** 0.037(0.012)*** 0.037(0.012)*** 0.037(0.015)** 0.037(0.016)**
Risk Loving 0.024(0.006)*** 0.024(0.006)*** 0.024(0.006)*** 0.024(0.006)*** 0.023(0.006)*** 0.019(0.008)** 0.018(0.008)**
Informal Sector -0.231(0.020)*** -0.221(0.020)*** -0.221(0.020)*** -0.221(0.020)*** -0.219(0.020)*** -0.246(0.026)*** -0.247(0.026)***
Self-Employed 0.156(0.023)*** 0.158(0.023)*** 0.158(0.023)*** 0.158(0.023)*** 0.158(0.023)*** 0.200(0.028)*** 0.200(0.028)***
Part-time Job 0.839(0.025)*** 0.844(0.025)*** 0.844(0.025)*** 0.844(0.025)*** 0.846(0.025)*** 0.780(0.030)*** 0.779(0.030)***
Under-educated 0.125(0.035)*** 0.122(0.035)*** 0.125(0.035)*** 0.125(0.035)*** 0.166(0.059)*** 0.168(0.060)***
Over-educated -0.081(0.019)*** -0.084(0.019)*** -0.082(0.020)*** -0.079(0.020)*** -0.113(0.024)*** -0.114(0.024)***
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.004(0.025) -0.005(0.025) -0.001(0.039) 0.001(0.039)
Strong Horizontal Mismatch -0.040(0.038)
Literacy score 0.000(0.000)***
Constant -0.367(0.177)** -0.410(0.177)** -0.408(0.177)** -0.409(0.177)** -0.328(0.178)* -0.250(0.215) -0.197(0.215)
Observations 14,293 14,293 14,293 14,293 14,274 8,953 8,953
R-squared 0.349 0.351 0.351 0.351 0.353 0.330 0.330
Maximum Parent Education No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Academic Performance in Primary or Secondary school No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Column (1) reports the results for regressing logarithm of hourly wages in U.S. dollars against the above mentioned variables. Column (2) adds the dummy variable for under-educated and
over-educated to the regression in column (1). Similarly, column (3) adds the dummy for strong horizontal mismatch whereas column (4) uses the dummy for weak horizontal mismatch instead of
strong horizontal mismatch used in column (3). Column (5) adds the proxy for ability measure in the regression in column (4) by adding dummies for the individual performance in primary or
secondary school and the maximum of parental education level. Column (6) adds the literacy score to the regression in column (5) but it should be noted that the number of observations are
reduced as literacy test was only conducted in 7 of 11 STEP countries. Column (7) provides comparison results of column (5) for those 7 countries. All regressions control for
country-industry-occupation fixed effect.
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Table 7: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Earnings-Secondary and above
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
USD log of Hourly earnings
Female -0.191(0.022)*** -0.186(0.022)*** -0.186(0.022)*** -0.187(0.022)*** -0.185(0.022)*** -0.209(0.028)*** -0.210(0.028)***
Post-secondary (specialized/vocational) -0.005(0.027) 0.031(0.027) 0.029(0.027) 0.029(0.027) 0.006(0.032) -0.126(0.054)** -0.120(0.055)**
Bachelors (4 years) 0.171(0.030)*** 0.223(0.031)*** 0.220(0.031)*** 0.220(0.031)*** 0.173(0.037)*** 0.022(0.063) 0.031(0.063)
Masters 0.439(0.039)*** 0.505(0.040)*** 0.503(0.040)*** 0.502(0.040)*** 0.438(0.046)*** 0.278(0.066)*** 0.293(0.066)***
Candidate of Science 0.590(0.059)*** 0.712(0.062)*** 0.710(0.062)*** 0.710(0.062)*** 0.647(0.067)*** 0.496(0.082)*** 0.510(0.082)***
Doctor of Science 0.900(0.172)*** 1.026(0.172)*** 1.025(0.172)*** 1.026(0.172)*** 0.974(0.168)*** 0.858(0.178)*** 0.867(0.178)***
Experience 0.010(0.003)*** 0.010(0.003)*** 0.010(0.003)*** 0.010(0.003)*** 0.010(0.003)*** 0.013(0.003)*** 0.013(0.003)***
Experience Squared -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)***
Height (in meters) 0.341(0.110)*** 0.342(0.110)*** 0.342(0.110)*** 0.341(0.110)*** 0.335(0.110)*** 0.310(0.128)** 0.311(0.128)**
Chronic Illness -0.013(0.028) -0.012(0.027) -0.011(0.028) -0.011(0.027) -0.011 (0.027) -0.019(0.033) -0.019(0.033)
Extraversion 0.041(0.015)*** 0.042(0.014)*** 0.042(0.014)*** 0.042(0.014)*** 0.043(0.015)*** 0.034(0.018)* 0.034(0.018)*
Conscientiousness 0.019(0.018) 0.016(0.018) 0.016(0.018) 0.016(0.018) 0.016(0.018) 0.013(0.022) 0.016(0.022)
Openness 0.060(0.017)*** 0.057(0.017)*** 0.057(0.017)*** 0.057(0.017)*** 0.056(0.017)*** 0.049(0.022)** 0.051(0.022)**
Agreeableness 0.001(0.017) 0.000(0.017) 0.000(0.017) 0.000(0.017) 0.000(0.017) -0.019(0.021) -0.018(0.021)
Emotional Stability 0.029(0.014)** 0.030(0.014)** 0.029(0.014)** 0.029(0.014)** 0.030(0.014)** 0.030(0.017)* 0.030(0.017)*
Risk Loving 0.035(0.007)*** 0.035(0.007)*** 0.035(0.007)*** 0.035(0.007)*** 0.035(0.009)*** 0.036(0.009)*** 0.036(0.009)***
Informal Sector -0.276(0.024)*** -0.263(0.024)*** -0.264(0.024)*** -0.263(0.024)*** -0.261(0.024)*** -0.260(0.030)*** -0.260(0.030)***
Self-Employed 0.219(0.029)*** 0.224(0.029)*** 0.224(0.029)*** 0.224(0.029)*** 0.224(0.029)*** 0.248(0.034)*** 0.248(0.034)***
Part-time Job 0.775(0.029)*** 0.780(0.029)*** 0.781(0.029)*** 0.781(0.029)*** 0.782(0.029)*** 0.764(0.034)*** 0.763(0.034)***
Under-educated 0.111(0.039)*** 0.103(0.040)*** 0.103(0.040)*** 0.110(0.040)*** 0.200(0.074)*** 0.202(0.074)***
Over-educated -0.118(0.022)*** -0.122(0.022)*** -0.125(0.023)*** -0.124(0.023)*** -0.150(0.027)*** -0.152(0.027)***
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.026(0.026) -0.025(0.026) -0.021(0.040) -0.021(0.040)
Strong Horizontal Mismatch -0.055(0.039)
Literacy score 0.000(0.000)**
Constant -0.141(0.204) -0.123(0.204) -0.116(0.204) -0.110(0.205) 0.007(0.214) 0.203(0.267) 0.291(0.265)
Observations 10,025 10,025 10,025 10,025 10,025 6,868 6,868
R-squared 0.336 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.340 0.324 0.323
Educational Field No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Maximum Parent Education No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Academic Performance in Primary or Secondary school No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 7 focuses on the workers with secondary or higher level of education. Column (1) reports the results for regressing logarithm of hourly wages in U.S. dollars against the above
mentioned variables. Column (2) adds the dummy variable for under-educated and over-educated to the regression in column (1). Similarly, column (3) adds the dummy for strong horizontal
mismatch whereas column (4) uses the dummy for weak horizontal mismatch instead of strong horizontal mismatch used in column (3). Column (5) adds the proxy for ability measure in the
regression in column (4) by adding dummies for the individual performance in primary or secondary school and the maximum of parental education level as well as educational field fixed effect.
Column (6) adds the literacy score to the regression in column (5) but it should be noted that the number of observations are reduced as literacy test was only conducted in 7 of 11 STEP countries.
Column (7) provides comparison results of column (5) for those 7 countries. All regressions control for country-industry-occupation fixed effect.
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Table 8: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5
Life satisfaction
USD log of Hourly earnings 0.254(0.020)*** 0.252(0.020)*** 0.252(0.020)*** 0.252(0.020)*** 0.210(0.021)***
Female 0.293(0.041)*** 0.296(0.041)*** 0.296(0.041)*** 0.296(0.041)*** 0.237(0.042)***
Married 0.375(0.044)*** 0.376(0.044)*** 0.376(0.044)*** 0.376(0.044)*** 0.367(0.044)***
Has Children -0.120(0.044)*** -0.120(0.044)*** -0.120(0.044)*** -0.121(0.044)*** -0.163(0.044)***
Primary Education 0.151(0.110) 0.162(0.110) 0.162(0.110) 0.160(0.110) 0.047(0.121)
Basic General 0.114(0.103) 0.171(0.104) 0.171(0.104) 0.172(0.104)* -0.030(0.112)
Secondary (General) 0.211(0.104)** 0.278(0.107)*** 0.282(0.107)*** 0.301(0.108)*** 0.008(0.115)
Postsecondary (specialized/vocational) 0.314(0.107)*** 0.415(0.113)*** 0.418(0.113)*** 0.431(0.113)*** 0.091(0.120)
Bachelors (4 years) 0.396(0.111)*** 0.511(0.117)*** 0.513(0.117)*** 0.525(0.117)*** 0.132(0.124)
Masters 0.776(0.120)*** 0.911(0.129)*** 0.912(0.129)*** 0.925(0.129)*** 0.441(0.136)***
Candidate of Science 0.559(0.173)*** 0.749(0.185)*** 0.750(0.185)*** 0.765(0.185)*** 0.279(0.190)
Doctor of Science 0.178(0.693) 0.373(0.694) 0.374(0.694) 0.391(0.694) -0.130(0.679)
Age -0.084(0.012)*** -0.085(0.012)*** -0.085(0.012)*** -0.084(0.012)*** -0.082(0.012)***
Age squared 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)***
Height (in meters) 0.457(0.205)** 0.455(0.205)** 0.456(0.205)** 0.454(0.205)** 0.195(0.209)
Chronic Illness -0.334(0.051)*** -0.335(0.051)*** -0.334(0.051)*** -0.333(0.051)*** -0.338(0.051)***
Extraversion 0.082(0.029)*** 0.081(0.029)*** 0.082(0.029)*** 0.081(0.029)*** 0.055(0.030)*
Conscientiousness -0.025(0.035) -0.026(0.035) -0.026(0.035) -0.027(0.035) -0.048(0.036)
Openness 0.071(0.033)** 0.068(0.033)** 0.068(0.033)** 0.068(0.033)** 0.031(0.033)
Agreeableness 0.197(0.031)*** 0.196(0.031)*** 0.196(0.031)*** 0.196(0.031)*** 0.192(0.032)***
Emotional Stability 0.264(0.029)*** 0.264(0.029)*** 0.264(0.029)*** 0.264(0.029)*** 0.243(0.030)***
Risk Loving 0.032(0.014)** 0.031(0.014)** 0.031(0.014)** 0.031(0.014)** 0.021(0.014)
Informal Sector -0.239(0.046)*** -0.228(0.047)*** -0.228(0.047)*** -0.228(0.047)*** -0.169(0.048)***
Self-Employed 0.301(0.048)*** 0.305(0.048)*** 0.305(0.048)*** 0.305(0.048)*** 0.214(0.049)***
Part-time Job -0.331(0.048)*** -0.323(0.048)*** -0.323(0.048)*** -0.322(0.048)*** -0.291(0.050)***
Under-educated 0.056(0.082) 0.051(0.083) 0.039(0.083) 0.016(0.084)
Over-educated -0.121(0.042)*** -0.124(0.042)*** -0.138(0.043)*** -0.104(0.044)**
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.095(0.067) -0.102(0.068)
Asset Wealth Index 0.339(0.020)***
Strong Horizontal Mismatch -0.057(0.114)
Constant 4.927(0.443)*** 4.902(0.443)*** 4.904(0.443)*** 4.913(0.443)*** 6.054(0.458)***
Observations 15,600 15,600 15,600 15,600 14,429
R-squared 0.267 0.268 0.268 0.268 0.291
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 8 explores the relationship between the life satisfaction of the individual and the education-occupation mismatch in the labor market. Column (1) regresses the above mentioned
variables against the life satisfaction measure recorded between 1 (very unhappy) and 10 (very happy). Column (2) adds the measure for vertical mismatch i.e. dummy for under-educated and
over-educated. Column (3) adds the measure of strong horizontal mismatch to column (2). Column (4) replaces strong horizontal mismatch in column (3) with weak horizontal mismatch. Column
(5) also controls for the relative asset position of the household in the country. All regressions control for country-industry-occupation fixed effect.
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Table 9: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Life Satisfaction-Secondary and above
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6
Life satisfaction
USD log of Hourly earnings 0.285(0.025)*** 0.282(0.025)*** 0.282(0.025)*** 0.225(0.026)*** 0.225(0.026)*** 0.224(0.026)***
Female 0.338(0.049)*** 0.339(0.049)*** 0.340(0.049)*** 0.269(0.049)*** 0.269(0.049)*** 0.266(0.049)***
Married 0.410(0.051)*** 0.410(0.051)*** 0.410(0.051)*** 0.408(0.051)*** 0.408(0.051)*** 0.408(0.051)***
Has Children -0.132(0.051)*** -0.131(0.051)*** -0.130(0.051)** -0.150(0.051)*** -0.150(0.051)*** -0.154(0.051)***
Postsecondary (specialized/vocational) 0.068(0.062) 0.093(0.063) 0.090(0.063) 0.023(0.065) 0.023(0.065) -0.004(0.079)
Bachelors (4 years) 0.156(0.065)** 0.192(0.067)*** 0.187(0.067)*** 0.078(0.068) 0.078(0.068) 0.065(0.085)
Masters 0.499(0.082)*** 0.554(0.087)*** 0.550(0.087)*** 0.352(0.089)*** 0.352(0.089)*** 0.340(0.107)***
Candidate of Science 0.294(0.148)** 0.401(0.155)*** 0.397(0.155)** 0.199(0.156) 0.199(0.156) 0.200(0.167)
Doctor of Science -0.045(0.683) 0.066(0.684) 0.064(0.684) -0.171(0.671) -0.171(0.671) -0.203(0.676)
Age -0.080(0.014)*** -0.081(0.014)*** -0.081(0.014)*** -0.083(0.014)*** -0.083(0.014)*** -0.083(0.014)***
Age squared 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)***
Height (in meters) 0.669(0.236)*** 0.666(0.236)*** 0.666(0.236)*** 0.411(0.237)* 0.411(0.237)* 0.419(0.237)*
Chronic Illness -0.387(0.060)*** -0.386(0.060)*** -0.384(0.060)*** -0.384(0.060)*** -0.384(0.060)*** -0.385(0.060)***
Extraversion 0.076(0.034)**) 0.076(0.034)** 0.077(0.034)** 0.062(0.034)* 0.062(0.034)* 0.062(0.034)*
Conscientiousness -0.044(0.042) -0.045(0.042) -0.045(0.042) -0.055(0.042) -0.055(0.042) -0.055(0.042)
Openness 0.108(0.039)*** 0.107(0.039)*** 0.107(0.039)*** 0.081(0.039)** 0.081(0.039)** 0.082(0.039)**
Agreeableness 0.222(0.036)*** 0.222(0.036)*** 0.222(0.036)*** 0.210(0.037)*** 0.210(0.037)*** 0.210(0.037)***
Emotional Stability 0.261(0.033)*** 0.261(0.033)*** 0.260(0.033)*** 0.253(0.034)*** 0.253(0.034)*** 0.253(0.034)***
Risk Loving 0.021(0.016) 0.020(0.016) 0.021(0.016) 0.017(0.016) 0.017(0.016) 0.017(0.016)
Informal Sector -0.207(0.054)*** -0.199(0.054)*** -0.199(0.054)*** -0.162(0.054)*** -0.162(0.054)*** -0.163(0.054)***
Self-Employed 0.219(0.058)*** 0.225(0.059)*** 0.223(0.058)*** 0.175(0.059)*** 0.175(0.059)*** 0.174(0.059)***
Part-time Job -0.321(0.057)*** -0.314(0.057)*** -0.313(0.057)*** -0.253(0.059)*** -0.253(0.059)*** -0.246(0.059)***
Under-educated -0.037(0.099) -0.055(0.099) -0.064(0.101) -0.064(0.101) -0.062(0.102)
Over-educated -0.117(0.047)** -0.128(0.048)*** -0.115(0.050)** -0.115(0.050)** -0.120(0.050)**
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.131(0.069)* -0.131(0.069)* -0.131(0.069)*
Asset Wealth Index 0.316(0.023)*** 0.316(0.023)*** 0.316(0.023)***
Strong Horizontal Mismatch -0.143(0.115)
Constant 4.621(0.504)*** 4.671(0.505)*** 4.689(0.505)*** 5.523(0.511)*** 5.523(0.511)*** 5.710(0.532)***
Observations 10,981 10,981 10,981 10,591 10,591 10,591
R-squared 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.278 0.278 0.279
Educational Field No No No No No Yes
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 9 explores the relationship between the life satisfaction of the individual and the education-occupation mismatch in the labor market but focuses on the workers having secondary or
higher level of education. Column (1) regresses the above mentioned variables against the life satisfaction measure recorded between 1 (very unhappy) and 10 (very happy). Column (2) adds the
measure for vertical mismatch i.e. dummy for under-educated and over-educated. Column (3) adds the measure of strong horizontal mismatch to column (2). Column (4) replaces strong horizontal
mismatch in column (3) with weak horizontal mismatch. Column (5) also controls for the relative asset position of the household in the country. Column (6) also controls for the educational field
fixed effect. All regressions control for country-industry-occupation fixed effect.
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6 Appendix
The appendix provides further robustness checks for the regression in the main text. The following
tables run the same regressions as earlier ones in the main text but for sub-groups. The sub-groups
have been primarily divided into two categories. In the first category, there is a separate regression
for each country in the dataset. Table 10 to Table 13 are in this category. In the second category,
there is regression for gender (male vs female), type of sector (informal vs formal) and whether
the individual is self-employed or an employee. Table 14 to Table 17 belongs to this category.
Table 10: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Aggregate Armenia Bolivia Colombia Georgia Ghana Kenya Laos Macedonia Sri Lanka Viet Nam Yunnan
USD log of Hourly earnings
Female -0.219(0.019)*** -0.332(0.079)*** -0.312(0.065)*** -0.306(0.072)*** -0.339(0.076)*** -0.360(0.092)*** -0.038(0.045) -0.122(0.081) -0.170(0.037)*** -0.454(0.067)*** -0.166(0.063)*** -0.023(0.044)
Primary Education 0.026(0.067) -2.515(0.314)*** -0.118(0.177) 0.400(0.330) 1.038(0.852) 0.724(0.506) -0.028(0.108) -0.552(0.346) -0.075(0.566) -0.021(0.122) -0.287(0.538)
Basic General 0.168(0.066)** -1.727(0.171)*** 0.124(0.161) 0.364(0.259) -0.120(0.219) 1.297(0.832) 0.764(0.505) 0.284(0.129)** -0.813(0.322)** -0.018(0.565) 0.209(0.120)* -0.351(0.538)
Secondary (General) 0.303(0.067)*** -1.726(0.133)*** 0.315(0.157)** 0.532(0.265)** 0.349(0.158)** 1.159(0.818) 1.038(0.519)** 0.204(0.138) -0.665(0.316)** -0.020(0.570) 0.405(0.126)*** -0.232(0.540)
Postsecondary (specialized/vocational) 0.354(0.070)*** -1.761(0.093)*** 0.097(0.165) 0.481(0.267)* 0.208(0.183) 1.238(0.825) 1.072(0.506)** -0.614(0.318)* 0.248(0.568) 0.486(0.141)*** -0.089(0.541)
Bachelors (4 years) 0.526(0.072)*** -1.418(0.158)*** 0.146(0.162) 0.641(0.272)** 0.292(0.171)* 1.374(0.838) 1.238(0.512)** -0.461(0.310) 0.522(0.575) 0.785(0.147)*** 0.117(0.543)
Masters 0.806(0.077)*** -1.458(0.080)*** 0.369(0.187)** 0.808(0.288)*** 0.476(0.177)*** 2.180(0.838)*** 1.675(0.511)*** 0.634(0.593) 1.167(0.216)*** 0.251(0.568)
Candidate of Science 0.977(0.092)*** -1.520(0.199)*** 1.048(0.441)** 1.469(0.321)*** 0.793(0.194)*** 2.637(0.656)*** 1.476(0.582)**
Doctor of Science 1.286(0.181)*** 1.083(0.273)*** 0.205(0.554)
Height (in meters) 0.213(0.090)** -0.216(0.353) 0.270(0.167) 0.008(0.391) 0.800(0.408)* -0.111(0.360) -0.074(0.214) 0.173(0.447) 0.371(0.180)** 0.052(0.301) 0.617(0.356)* 0.799(0.323)**
Chronic Illness -0.032(0.023) -0.008(0.082) 0.027(0.068) -0.055(0.068) -0.058(0.073) 0.008(0.138) -0.276(0.110)** 0.025(0.094) -0.036(0.044) 0.027(0.085) -0.069(0.055) 0.036(0.047)
Experience 0.015(0.002)*** 0.012(0.007) 0.016(0.008)* 0.016(0.006)*** 0.014(0.009) 0.020(0.012) 0.023(0.007)*** 0.037(0.009)*** 0.007(0.005) 0.005(0.009) 0.011(0.006)* 0.020(0.005)***
Experience Squared -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)* -0.000(0.000)** -0.000(0.000)** -0.000(0.000)* -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000)** -0.001(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000)* -0.000(0.000)***
Informal Sector -0.219(0.020)*** 0.146(0.141) -0.210(0.076)*** -0.265(0.058)*** -0.252(0.056)*** -0.370(0.099)*** -0.407(0.060)*** -0.019(0.088) -0.162(0.057)*** -0.116(0.062)* -0.115(0.056)** -0.214(0.042)***
Self-Employed 0.158(0.023)*** 0.251(0.142)* 0.185(0.071)*** -0.076(0.065) 0.036(0.105) 0.520(0.124)*** 0.217(0.054)*** -0.089(0.104) 0.088(0.064) -0.088(0.073) 0.307(0.059)*** 0.600(0.083)***
Extraversion 0.029(0.013)** 0.023(0.039) 0.028(0.040) 0.020(0.035) 0.013(0.047) 0.040(0.065) 0.010(0.035) 0.017(0.061) 0.014(0.024) 0.066(0.047) 0.069(0.040)* 0.037(0.036)
Conscientiousness 0.043(0.016)*** 0.005(0.049) -0.044(0.051) -0.010(0.051) 0.089(0.054)* 0.040(0.081) 0.085(0.044)* 0.212(0.065)*** -0.033(0.029) 0.027(0.056) -0.000(0.042) 0.056(0.046)
Openness 0.038(0.015)*** 0.148(0.053)*** -0.059(0.054) 0.019(0.043) 0.072(0.057) 0.033(0.075) 0.087(0.039)** -0.013(0.055) -0.001(0.031) 0.028(0.049) 0.057(0.039) 0.056(0.040)
Agreeableness 0.011(0.014) -0.119(0.058)** 0.008(0.044) 0.031(0.041) -0.126(0.050)** 0.078(0.067) -0.074(0.038)* 0.161(0.056)*** 0.017(0.024) 0.136(0.050)*** -0.014(0.046) -0.009(0.043)
Emotional Stability 0.037(0.012)*** 0.059(0.037) 0.041(0.040) -0.039(0.033) 0.034(0.037) 0.016(0.073) 0.038(0.042) 0.101(0.058)* 0.001(0.021) 0.045(0.044) 0.097(0.039)** 0.019(0.041)
Risk Loving 0.023(0.006)*** 0.022(0.019) 0.014(0.022) 0.028(0.024) 0.057(0.022)** 0.045(0.034) 0.008(0.018) 0.049(0.028)* 0.022(0.011)* 0.064(0.021)*** -0.004(0.015) -0.013(0.013)
Part-time Job 0.846(0.025)*** 0.530(0.066)*** 0.797(0.067)*** 1.022(0.070)*** 0.480(0.069)*** 0.831(0.134)*** 0.825(0.074)*** 1.113(0.090)*** 0.691(0.069)*** 0.993(0.062)*** 0.887(0.082)*** 1.275(0.134)***
Over-educated -0.079(0.020)*** -0.119(0.091) -0.038(0.067) -0.070(0.052) -0.205(0.090)** -0.279(0.099)*** -0.032(0.053)-0.061(0.103) 0.030(0.048) 0.033(0.071) -0.243(0.049)*** -0.168(0.066)**
Under-educated 0.125(0.035)*** -0.143(0.135) -0.071(0.139) 0.391(0.225)* 0.424(0.262) 0.104(0.133) 0.237(0.124)* 0.197(0.101)* -0.041(0.043) 0.030(0.499) 0.395(0.169)** 0.190(0.077)**
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.005(0.025) 0.013(0.083) -0.273(0.170) -0.064(0.092) -0.031(0.108) -0.184(0.145) 0.211(0.121)* -0.226(0.310) -0.066(0.041) 0.161(0.094)* 0.007(0.067) -0.047(0.046)
Constant -0.328(0.178)* 2.402(0.698)*** 0.767(0.420)* 0.507(0.710) -1.211(0.780) -1.515(1.088) -0.846(0.651) -1.705(0.791)** 1.345(0.479)*** -0.430(0.782) -0.927(0.648) -0.646(0.774)
Observations 14,274 908 1,170 1,382 848 757 1,891 1,420 1,494 1,224 1,997 1,183
R-squared 0.353 0.270 0.305 0.313 0.380 0.313 0.393 0.299 0.384 0.346 0.281 0.433
Maximum Parent Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Performance in Primary or Secondary school Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 10 here reports the variation in results across countries. Column (1) regresses the logarithm of hourly wage in U.S. dollars against the variables stated above, including the mismatch
variables, for the aggregate data. Column (2) through column (12) runs the similar regression as column (1) but separately for each country. All regressions control for the maximum parental
education, performance of the individual in primary or secondary school and the country-industry-occupation fixed effects.
Table 11: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Earnings-Secondary and above
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Aggregate Armenia Bolivia Colombia Georgia Ghana Kenya Laos Macedonia Sri Lanka Viet Nam Yunnan
USD log of Hourly earnings
Female -0.198(0.022)*** -0.321(0.083)*** -0.333(0.071)*** -0.339(0.079)*** -0.289(0.083)*** -0.378(0.097)*** 0.015(0.060) 0.043(0.125) -0.155(0.041)*** -0.449(0.102)*** -0.037(0.074) -0.063(0.052)
Postsecondary (specialized/vocational) -0.008(0.033) -0.034(0.098) 0.033(0.428) 0.624(0.342)* -0.315(0.317) -0.265(0.330) 0.137(0.162) 0.068(0.069) -0.071(0.195) 0.176(0.187) 0.143(0.060)**
Bachelors (4 years) 0.146(0.038)*** 0.259(0.198) 0.044(0.429) 0.787(0.346)** -0.237(0.319) -0.224(0.372) 0.213(0.161) 0.212(0.063)*** 0.159(0.240) 0.445(0.199)** 0.286(0.078)***
Masters 0.395(0.047)*** 0.237(0.110)** 0.248(0.436) 0.934(0.333)*** -0.117(0.321) 0.536(0.370) 0.615(0.162)*** 0.653(0.311)** 0.293(0.267) 0.917(0.245)*** 0.419(0.190)**
Candidate of Science 0.592(0.068)*** 0.178(0.228) 0.525(0.886) 1.586(0.325)*** 0.253(0.329) 1.572(0.414)*** 0.862(0.267)***
Doctor of Science 0.915(0.168)*** 1.713(0.150)*** 0.567(0.372) 0.468(0.123)***
Height (in meters) 0.289(0.110)*** -0.301(0.378) 0.398(0.235)* -0.378(0.452) 0.885(0.415)** 0.068(0.375) 0.001(0.259) -0.066(0.834) 0.344(0.195)* 0.065(0.506) 1.371(0.460)*** 0.422(0.368)
Chronic Illness -0.006(0.027) -0.014(0.085) 0.104(0.074) -0.089(0.077) -0.059(0.072) 0.056(0.144) -0.253(0.144)* 0.225(0.194) -0.013(0.047) 0.017(0.123) -0.025(0.077) 0.035(0.058)
Experience 0.011(0.003)*** 0.011(0.008) 0.016(0.008)* 0.014(0.007)* 0.013(0.009) 0.021(0.013) 0.017(0.010)* 0.032(0.015)** 0.008(0.005)* 0.002(0.014) 0.013(0.008)* 0.021(0.007)***
Experience Squared -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000)** -0.000(0.000)* -0.000(0.000)* -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.001(0.000)** -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000)***
Informal Sector -0.258(0.024)*** 0.172(0.153) -0.305(0.078)*** -0.278(0.065)*** -0.242(0.057)*** -0.323(0.103)*** -0.497(0.071)*** -0.022(0.113) -0.166(0.067)** -0.325(0.103)*** -0.056(0.072) -0.273(0.054)***
Self-Employed 0.225(0.029)*** 0.244(0.149) 0.300(0.080)*** -0.044(0.072) 0.027(0.107) 0.471(0.129)*** 0.310(0.075)*** 0.003(0.181) 0.040(0.074) 0.085(0.118) 0.390(0.085)*** 0.590(0.101)***
Extraversion 0.042(0.014)*** 0.022(0.040) -0.019(0.045) 0.035(0.038) 0.011(0.047) 0.062(0.068) 0.047(0.045) 0.131(0.096) 0.008(0.025) 0.060(0.068) 0.133(0.054)** 0.046(0.046)
Conscientiousness 0.016(0.018) 0.011(0.051) -0.087(0.057) -0.044(0.049) 0.083(0.054) 0.040(0.088) 0.118(0.058)** 0.026(0.105) -0.033(0.032) 0.081(0.079) 0.036(0.047) 0.028(0.053)
Openness 0.049(0.017)*** 0.136(0.054)** -0.054(0.061) -0.002(0.048) 0.063(0.058) 0.054(0.080) 0.108(0.051)** -0.046(0.091) -0.005(0.032) 0.099(0.077) 0.049(0.050) 0.046(0.050)
Agreeableness 0.001(0.017) -0.121(0.058)** 0.021(0.051) 0.055(0.045) -0.128(0.051)** 0.084(0.072) -0.093(0.050)* 0.073(0.095) 0.014(0.025) 0.155(0.084)* -0.032(0.057) 0.041(0.049)
Emotional Stability 0.029(0.014)** 0.066(0.038)* 0.001(0.044) -0.030(0.035) 0.038(0.038) -0.014(0.077) -0.007(0.053) 0.154(0.092)* -0.012(0.022) 0.030(0.062) 0.127(0.052)** 0.041(0.050)
Risk Loving 0.034(0.007)*** 0.025(0.020) 0.020(0.024) 0.038(0.022)* 0.055(0.022)** 0.042(0.036) 0.022(0.022) 0.109(0.046)** 0.020(0.012) 0.095(0.030)*** 0.026(0.017) -0.026(0.015)*
Part-time Job 0.783(0.029)*** 0.537(0.068)*** 0.860(0.076)*** 0.999(0.080)*** 0.480(0.070)*** 0.833(0.144)*** 0.810(0.104)*** 1.027(0.148)*** 0.697(0.079)*** 0.923(0.099)*** 0.846(0.102)*** 1.178(0.174)***
Over-educated -0.120(0.023)*** -0.122(0.098) -0.044(0.073) -0.141(0.056)** -0.239(0.091)*** -0.304(0.104)*** -0.103(0.066) -0.144(0.170) 0.046(0.052) 0.055(0.093) -0.274(0.061)*** -0.196(0.073)***
Under-educated 0.108(0.040)*** -0.114(0.140) 0.052(0.177) 0.979(0.149)*** 0.382(0.257) 0.189(0.141) 0.199(0.182) 0.122(0.132) -0.066(0.048) 0.407(0.222)* 0.321(0.131)**
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.025(0.026) 0.022(0.084) -0.280(0.174) -0.085(0.094) -0.052(0.110) -0.217(0.148) 0.170(0.126) -0.193(0.312) -0.078(0.042)* 0.164(0.102) 0.008(0.069) -0.033(0.047)
Constant 0.131(0.216) 0.767(0.766) 1.465(0.713)** 1.839(0.780)** -0.690(0.873) -0.242(0.821) 0.409(0.587) -0.568(1.496) 0.753(0.395)* -0.530(1.027) -2.628(0.859)*** -0.324(0.695)
Observations 10,015 879 951 1,100 834 715 1,208 475 1,309 614 1,181 749
R-squared 0.344 0.274 0.332 0.328 0.384 0.330 0.385 0.349 0.372 0.366 0.283 0.423
Educational Field Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maximum Parent Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Performance in Primary or Secondary school Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 11 here reports the variation in results across countries. Column (1) regresses the logarithm of hourly wage in U.S. dollars against the variables stated above, including the mismatch
variables, for the workers with secondary and higher level of education across all countries. Column (2) through column (12) runs the similar regression as column (1) but separately for each
country. All regressions control for the educational field, maximum parental education, performance of the individual in primary or secondary school and the country-industry-occupation fixed
effects.
28
Table 12: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Aggregate Armenia Bolivia Colombia Georgia Ghana Kenya Laos Macedonia Sri Lanka Viet Nam Yunnan
Life satisfaction
log(wage) 0.210(0.021)*** 0.349(0.142)** 0.158(0.057)*** 0.083(0.060) 0.287(0.118)** 0.182(0.078)** 0.286(0.049)*** 0.166(0.057)*** 0.601(0.112)*** 0.148(0.114) 0.119(0.050)** 0.234(0.097)**
Female 0.237(0.042)*** 0.375(0.218)* 0.272(0.124)** -0.058(0.140) 0.232(0.208) 0.596(0.200)*** 0.220(0.093)** 0.087(0.157) 0.294(0.159)* 0.592(0.237)** 0.344(0.111)*** 0.278(0.155)*
Primary Education 0.047(0.121) -2.116(0.774)*** -0.533(0.388) -0.277(0.724) 0.831(1.128) 0.054(0.281) 0.408(0.218)* -3.207(0.842)*** 1.468(0.858)* 0.474(0.223)** -0.898(0.784)
Basic General -0.030(0.112) -0.055(0.633) -0.715(0.353)** -0.770(0.650) -2.739(0.618)*** -0.030(0.995) 0.376(0.265) 0.238(0.243) -1.661(0.561)*** 1.008(0.782) 0.270(0.215) -0.931(0.746)
Secondary (General) 0.008(0.115) 0.203(0.419) -0.371(0.317) -1.050(0.657) -1.031(0.445)** -0.071(0.888) 0.287(0.349) 0.207(0.257) -1.262(0.552)** 1.418(0.829)* 0.338(0.223) -1.029(0.761)
Postsecondary (specialized/vocational) 0.091(0.120) 0.508(0.426) -0.385(0.310) -0.750(0.651) -0.633(0.518) -0.037(0.900) 0.570(0.276)** -0.644(0.609) 1.147(0.848) 0.490(0.269)* -1.084(0.770)
Bachelors (4 years) 0.132(0.124) 0.220(0.523) -0.443(0.301) -0.450(0.652) -0.619(0.480) -0.010(0.932) 0.510(0.304)* -0.703(0.594) 0.749(0.885) 0.377(0.253) -1.034(0.784)
Masters 0.441(0.136)*** 0.649(0.440) 0.054(0.329) -0.521(0.664) -1.098(0.497)** 0.235(0.931) 1.192(0.302)*** -1.317(1.433) 1.028(0.970) 0.732(0.450) -1.008(1.487)
Candidate of Science 0.279(0.190) 0.636(0.641) -0.200(0.815) -0.105(0.727) -0.533(0.550) 1.336(0.758)* 0.428 (0.976)
Doctor of Science -0.130(0.679) 2.941(0.605)*** -0.796 (0.915) -1.684(0.847)**
Married 0.367(0.044)*** 0.808(0.190)*** 0.355(0.139)** 0.305(0.108)*** 0.439(0.197)** 0.385(0.182)** 0.059(0.095) 0.239(0.194) 0.628(0.165)*** 0.191(0.284) 0.462(0.112)*** 0.658(0.190)***
Has Children -0.163(0.044)*** -0.001(0.184) -0.130(0.152) -0.173(0.115) -0.274(0.184) -0.214(0.199) -0.275(0.102)*** -0.231(0.203) -0.212(0.159) -0.344(0.244) -0.062(0.107) -0.057(0.141)
Height (in meters) 0.195(0.209) 1.213(1.178) -0.009(0.437) -0.626(0.721) 0.580(1.205) -0.964(0.708) 0.063(0.392) 0.149(0.833) -0.095(0.820) 1.281(0.976) -0.065(0.723) 1.485(1.119)
Chronic Illness -0.338(0.051)*** -0.522(0.211)** -0.215(0.132) -0.393(0.140)*** -0.315(0.209) -0.995(0.281)*** -0.296(0.185) -0.198(0.188) -0.613(0.206)*** -0.350(0.238) 0.035(0.101) -0.537(0.176)***
Age -0.082(0.012)*** -0.243(0.051)*** -0.129(0.035)*** -0.056(0.030)* -0.073(0.056) -0.110(0.057)* -0.042(0.029) -0.029(0.049) -0.200(0.043)*** -0.085(0.065) -0.130(0.029)*** -0.021(0.049)
Age squared 0.001(0.000)*** 0.002(0.001)*** 0.002(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)* 0.000(0.001) 0.002(0.001)** 0.001(0.000) 0.000(0.001) 0.002(0.000)*** 0.001(0.001) 0.002(0.000)*** 0.000(0.001)
Extraversion 0.055(0.030)* -0.005(0.131) 0.202(0.078)*** 0.073(0.076) -0.152(0.148) -0.125(0.140) 0.093(0.068) -0.044(0.124) 0.012(0.094) 0.049(0.168) -0.016(0.079) -0.105(0.117)
Conscientiousness -0.048(0.036) -0.242(0.160) -0.014(0.112) -0.144(0.094) -0.402(0.161)** -0.185(0.169) 0.087(0.084) 0.045(0.140) -0.030(0.126) 0.012(0.201) 0.133(0.081)* -0.078(0.142)
Openness 0.031(0.033) 0.234(0.184) 0.086(0.104) 0.058(0.096) 0.160(0.171) -0.193(0.154) -0.041(0.078) -0.275(0.116)** 0.249(0.106)** 0.007(0.202) 0.067(0.074) 0.080(0.126)
Agreeableness 0.192(0.032)*** 0.181(0.154) 0.252(0.084)*** -0.017(0.086) 0.610(0.158)*** 0.369(0.142)*** 0.137(0.075)* 0.250(0.113)** 0.136(0.096) 0.390(0.192)** 0.098(0.080) 0.279(0.136)**
Emotional Stability 0.243(0.030)*** 0.084(0.124) 0.332(0.080)*** 0.321(0.069)*** 0.270(0.111)** 0.218(0.150) 0.129(0.089) 0.122(0.118) 0.241(0.086)*** 0.488(0.178)*** 0.097(0.078) 0.445(0.139)***
Risk Loving 0.021(0.014) 0.011(0.070) -0.024(0.041) -0.061(0.044) 0.090(0.066) 0.035(0.068) 0.101(0.035)*** -0.015(0.062) -0.024(0.047) 0.093(0.078) 0.050(0.029)* -0.019(0.042)
Informal Sector -0.169(0.048)*** -0.469(0.293) -0.243(0.155) -0.268(0.130)** -0.137(0.170) -0.177(0.219) -0.118(0.115) -0.172(0.203) -0.399(0.183)** -0.183(0.241) 0.009(0.111) 0.155(0.140)
Self-Employed 0.214(0.049)*** 1.131(0.356)*** 0.107(0.145) -0.010(0.129) -0.418(0.278) 0.294(0.241) 0.157(0.099) 0.165(0.201) 0.490(0.189)*** 0.846(0.267)*** 0.121(0.112) 0.112(0.198)
Part-time Job -0.291(0.050)*** -0.525(0.192)*** -0.093(0.128) -0.157(0.141) -0.143(0.182) -0.606(0.222)*** -0.427(0.122)*** -0.339(0.172)** -0.457(0.229)** -0.449(0.240)* -0.183(0.129) 0.203(0.264)
Asset Wealth Index 0.339(0.020)*** 0.083(0.081) 0.339(0.061)*** 0.251(0.059)*** 0.180(0.077)** 0.391(0.110)*** 0.337(0.053)*** 0.324(0.082)*** 0.298(0.065)*** 0.646(0.111)*** 0.347(0.045)*** 0.376(0.064)***
Over-educated -0.104(0.044)** -0.274(0.220) -0.075(0.132) -0.284(0.113)** -0.559(0.235)** 0.093(0.182) -0.104(0.106) 0.127(0.190) -0.472(0.187)** -0.210(0.217) -0.112(0.096) -0.263(0.219)
Under-educated 0.016(0.084) 0.087(0.464) 0.094(0.293) -0.929(0.471)** -0.286(0.569) -0.291(0.281) -0.489(0.286)* -0.069(0.185) -0.018(0.181) 3.091(0.787)*** -0.010(0.348) 0.361(0.239)
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.102(0.068) 0.248(0.235) -0.138(0.330) -0.104(0.192) -0.097(0.337) -0.009(0.344) -0.001(0.214) 0.142(0.523) -0.173(0.166) -0.736(0.342)** -0.143(0.144) -0.393(0.158)**
Constant 6.054(0.458)*** 7.146(2.366)*** 7.346(1.118)*** 10.410(1.548)*** 6.484(2.479)*** 8.292(2.027)*** 3.398(0.922)*** 7.300(1.798)*** 9.520(1.669)*** 2.480(2.189) 6.704(1.420)*** 3.486(2.329)
Observations 14,429 957 1,459 1,566 876 822 2,086 1,194 1,600 543 2,119 1,207
R-squared 0.291 0.195 0.149 0.112 0.214 0.167 0.223 0.087 0.231 0.274 0.141 0.155
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 12 explores the relationship between the life satisfaction of the individual and the education-occupation mismatch in the labor market. Column (1) regresses the above mentioned
variables against the life satisfaction measure recorded between 1 (very unhappy) and 10 (very happy), including the mismatch variables. Column (2) through column (12) runs the similar
regression as column (1) but separately for each country. All regressions control for country-industry-occupation fixed effect.
Table 13: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Life Satisfaction-Secondary and above
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Aggregate Armenia Bolivia Colombia Georgia Ghana Kenya Laos Macedonia Sri Lanka Viet Nam Yunnan
Life satisfaction
USD log of Hourly earnings 0.224(0.026)*** 0.346(0.141)** 0.165(0.062)*** 0.027(0.070) 0.299(0.119)** 0.153(0.081)* 0.260(0.061)*** 0.106(0.104) 0.617(0.119)*** -0.063(0.131) 0.151(0.064)** 0.325(0.142)**
Female 0.266(0.049)*** 0.362(0.224) 0.387(0.137)*** -0.137(0.154) 0.251(0.225) 0.511(0.206)** 0.176(0.122) 0.274(0.262) 0.276(0.177) 0.788(0.274)*** 0.284(0.129)** 0.199(0.186)
Postsecondary (specialized/vocational) -0.004(0.079) -0.081(0.354) -0.282(0.452) -1.603(0.278)*** 0.601(0.776) -0.709(0.575) 0.464(0.294) 0.660(0.259)** 0.087(0.490) 0.250(0.285) -0.118(0.179)
Bachelors (4 years) 0.065(0.085) -0.300(0.452) -0.364(0.449) -1.279(0.283)*** 0.622(0.741) -0.605(0.644) 0.309(0.305) 0.626(0.218)*** -0.477(0.597) 0.226(0.284) 0.050(0.252)
Masters 0.340(0.107)*** 0.121(0.378) 0.107(0.462) -1.582(0.336)*** 0.137(0.782) -0.564(0.607) 0.957(0.306)*** 0.154(1.331) 0.026(0.719) 0.515(0.475) 0.302(1.235)
Candidate of Science 0.200(0.167) 0.230(0.616) -0.061(0.873) -1.153(0.485)** 0.777(0.805) 1.097(0.738) -0.819(0.850)
Doctor of Science -0.203(0.676) 2.532(0.577)*** 0.271(1.069) -0.886(0.430)**
Married 0.408(0.051)*** 0.768(0.195)*** 0.576(0.149)*** 0.317(0.118)*** 0.413(0.200)** 0.361(0.189)* -0.068(0.123) 0.490(0.311) 0.701(0.171)*** 0.095(0.407) 0.374(0.138)*** 0.550(0.215)**
Has Children -0.154(0.051)*** 0.001(0.186) -0.331(0.160)** -0.095(0.125) -0.289(0.187) -0.208(0.204) -0.166(0.134) 0.074(0.325) -0.263(0.164) -0.094(0.286) -0.065(0.130) 0.012(0.178)
Height (in meters) 0.419(0.237)* 1.467(1.203) 0.917(0.497)* -0.970(0.805) 0.352(1.232) -0.760(0.733) -0.066(0.467) 0.007(1.591) -0.103(0.874) 2.223(1.191)* 0.479(0.795) -0.677(1.257)
Chronic Illness -0.385(0.060)*** -0.644(0.214)*** -0.205(0.144) -0.429(0.160)*** -0.295(0.211) -1.062(0.288)*** -0.379(0.262) -0.152(0.355) -0.519(0.213)** -0.089(0.259) 0.061(0.124) -0.558(0.202)***
Age -0.083(0.014)*** -0.254(0.053)*** -0.128(0.039)*** -0.046(0.033) -0.083(0.056) -0.095(0.059) -0.015(0.039) -0.090(0.076) -0.181(0.045)*** -0.147(0.091) -0.131(0.035)*** 0.008(0.057)
Age squared 0.001(0.000)*** 0.003(0.001)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.000(0.000) 0.001(0.001) 0.002(0.001)** 0.000(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 0.002(0.001)*** 0.002(0.001)* 0.002(0.000)*** -0.000(0.001)
Extraversion 0.062(0.034)* -0.027(0.133) 0.129(0.083) 0.122(0.086) -0.199(0.152) -0.152(0.146) 0.073(0.085) 0.113(0.185) 0.036(0.099) -0.055(0.203) 0.067(0.089) -0.061(0.149)
Conscientiousness -0.055(0.042) -0.237(0.163) 0.109(0.117) -0.163(0.104) -0.393(0.165)** -0.139(0.179) 0.154(0.106) 0.342(0.219) -0.156(0.132) 0.011(0.233) 0.111(0.095) -0.115(0.171)
Openness 0.082(0.039)** 0.274(0.188) 0.110(0.106) 0.061(0.107) 0.254(0.174) -0.149(0.158) 0.068(0.097) -0.204(0.179) 0.233(0.113)** 0.201(0.240) -0.024(0.097) 0.141(0.160)
Agreeableness 0.210(0.037)*** 0.206(0.158) 0.280(0.092)*** 0.065(0.093) 0.601(0.162)*** 0.345(0.153)** 0.125(0.093) 0.104(0.182) 0.097(0.101) 0.494(0.217)** 0.188(0.092)** 0.263(0.174)
Emotional Stability 0.253(0.034)*** 0.089(0.126) 0.377(0.086)*** 0.259(0.074)*** 0.241(0.116)** 0.181(0.154) -0.057(0.109) 0.139(0.180) 0.326(0.091)*** 0.741(0.213)*** 0.019(0.094) 0.465(0.157)***
Risk Loving 0.017(0.016) 0.014(0.071) -0.016(0.044) -0.077(0.045)* 0.077(0.068) 0.032(0.070) 0.137(0.042)*** -0.042(0.095) -0.005(0.049) 0.110(0.086) 0.025(0.033) -0.050(0.052)
Informal Sector -0.163(0.054)*** -0.270(0.301) -0.143(0.163) -0.426(0.144)*** -0.130(0.170) -0.146(0.229) -0.055(0.130) 0.155(0.259) -0.452(0.201)** -0.093(0.291) 0.046(0.136) 0.173(0.183)
Self-Employed 0.174(0.059)*** 0.935(0.357)*** -0.006(0.150) 0.269(0.144)* -0.434(0.281) 0.227(0.255) 0.112(0.128) -0.029(0.281) 0.468(0.209)** 0.434(0.353) 0.060(0.144) -0.041(0.270)
Part-time Job -0.246(0.059)*** -0.530(0.194)*** -0.071(0.138) -0.179(0.156) -0.099(0.188) -0.477(0.220)** -0.388(0.163)** -0.226(0.280) -0.472(0.256)* 0.138(0.287) -0.122(0.157) 0.539(0.354)
Asset Wealth Index 0.316(0.023)*** 0.067(0.082) 0.333(0.064)*** 0.198(0.064)*** 0.178(0.079)** 0.382(0.115)*** 0.428(0.065)*** 0.314(0.125)** 0.291(0.068)*** 0.647(0.132)*** 0.305(0.060)*** 0.428(0.092)***
Over-educated -0.120(0.050)** -0.220(0.225) -0.145(0.137) -0.310(0.125)** -0.613(0.245)** 0.073(0.191) -0.041(0.129) 0.071(0.275) -0.512(0.207)** -0.387(0.235) -0.095(0.113) -0.327(0.233)
Under-educated -0.062(0.102) 0.124(0.477) -0.595(0.389) -0.546(1.238) -0.370(0.620) -0.330(0.304) -0.108(0.438) -0.042(0.256) -0.087(0.202) 0.040(0.429) 0.577(0.358)
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.131(0.069)* 0.289(0.238) -0.208(0.331) -0.113(0.194) -0.088(0.339) -0.080(0.351) 0.011(0.224) 0.060(0.542) -0.169(0.171) -0.659(0.345)* -0.131(0.144) -0.441(0.162)***
Constant 5.710(0.532)*** 7.442(2.532)*** 5.539(1.308)*** 12.135(1.696)*** 6.703(2.686)** 9.065(1.944)*** 3.255(1.264)** 7.165(3.192)** 8.414(1.882)*** 0.871(2.802) 6.652(1.627)*** 5.352(2.555)**
Observations 10,591 926 1,204 1,249 860 778 1,328 468 1,413 332 1,267 766
R-squared 0.279 0.202 0.168 0.125 0.208 0.177 0.236 0.156 0.210 0.347 0.146 0.197
Educational Field Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 13 explores the relationship between the life satisfaction of the individual and the education-occupation mismatch in the labor market, who have atleast secondary level of education.
Column (1) regresses the above mentioned variables against the life satisfaction measure recorded between 1 (very unhappy) and 10 (very happy), including the mismatch variables. Column (2)
through column (12) runs the similar regression as column (1) but separately for each country. All regressions control for educational field as well as country-industry-occupation fixed effect.
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Table 14: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Aggregate Female Male Informal Formal Self-employed Employee
USD log of Hourly earnings
Female -0.219(0.019)*** -0.275(0.028)*** -0.148(0.022)*** -0.292(0.041)*** -0.172(0.018)***
Primary Education 0.026(0.067) 0.053(0.087) -0.038(0.109) 0.034(0.072) 0.087(0.201) 0.050(0.092) 0.010(0.091)
Basic General 0.168(0.066)** 0.192(0.087)** 0.096(0.105) 0.200(0.073)*** 0.108(0.196) 0.302(0.093)*** 0.054(0.091)
Secondary (General) 0.303(0.067)*** 0.335(0.089)*** 0.241(0.107)** 0.340(0.077)*** 0.274(0.196) 0.461(0.099)*** 0.178(0.092)*
Postsecondary (specialized/vocational) 0.354(0.070)*** 0.394(0.094)*** 0.283(0.109)*** 0.343(0.082)*** 0.385(0.196)** 0.516(0.108)*** 0.252(0.094)***
Bachelors (4 years) 0.526(0.072)*** 0.577(0.098)*** 0.427(0.113)*** 0.494(0.089)*** 0.572(0.197)*** 0.598(0.115)*** 0.463(0.096)***
Masters 0.806(0.077)*** 0.850(0.106)*** 0.732(0.119)*** 0.795(0.101)*** 0.811(0.199)*** 0.944(0.136)*** 0.707(0.099)***
Candidate of Science 0.977(0.092)*** 0.999(0.123)*** 0.877(0.150)*** 0.927(0.121)*** 1.039(0.211)*** 1.339(0.199)*** 0.809(0.111)***
Doctor of Science 1.286(0.181)*** 1.353(0.200)*** 1.017(0.326)*** 1.169(0.254)*** 1.436(0.283)*** 0.775(0.805) 1.298(0.175)***
Height (in meters) 0.213(0.090)** -0.035(0.128) 0.357(0.130)*** 0.185(0.125) 0.292(0.112)*** 0.035(0.179) 0.372(0.088)***
Chronic Illness -0.032(0.023) -0.037(0.031) -0.017(0.035) -0.049(0.034) -0.023(0.027) -0.037(0.046) -0.016(0.023)
Experience 0.015(0.002)*** 0.012(0.003)*** 0.019(0.003)*** 0.016(0.004)*** 0.011(0.003)*** 0.016(0.005)*** 0.012(0.002)***
Experience Squared -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)***
Informal Sector -0.219(0.020)*** -0.268(0.029)*** -0.199(0.028)*** -0.276(0.078)*** -0.215(0.020)***
Self-Employed 0.158(0.023)*** 0.170(0.035)*** 0.146(0.031)*** 0.138(0.026)*** 0.253(0.068)***
Extraversion 0.029(0.013)** 0.048(0.018)** 0.011(0.018) 0.025(0.019) 0.035(0.015)** 0.042(0.027) 0.017(0.013)
Conscientiousness 0.043(0.016)*** 0.057(0.023)** 0.023(0.022) 0.072(0.023)*** -0.008(0.018) 0.102(0.034)*** 0.003(0.015)
Openness 0.038(0.015)*** 0.043(0.021)** 0.041(0.020)** 0.046(0.021)** 0.021(0.018) 0.027(0.030) 0.037(0.014)**
Agreeableness 0.011(0.014) 0.012(0.021) 0.008(0.019) 0.006(0.021) 0.027(0.017) 0.023(0.030) 0.007(0.014)
Emotional Stability 0.037(0.012)*** 0.054(0.017)*** 0.012(0.017) 0.046(0.019)** 0.027(0.014)* 0.040(0.027) 0.037(0.012)***
Risk Loving 0.023(0.006)*** 0.016(0.009)* 0.033(0.008)*** 0.019(0.009)* 0.025(0.007)*** 0.031(0.014)** 0.016(0.006)***
Part-time Job 0.846(0.025)*** 0.859(0.033)*** 0.858(0.038)*** 0.933(0.031)*** 0.601(0.036)*** 1.035(0.043)*** 0.693(0.028)***
Over-educated -0.079(0.020)*** -0.096(0.030)*** -0.047(0.027)* -0.099(0.030)*** -0.046(0.024)* -0.135(0.042)*** -0.058(0.020)***
Under-educated 0.125(0.035)*** 0.157(0.056)*** 0.109(0.045)** 0.203(0.067)*** 0.086(0.033)*** 0.280(0.095)*** 0.080(0.030)***
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.005(0.025) -0.018(0.036) -0.012(0.035) 0.024(0.050) -0.013(0.025) 0.065(0.071) -0.023(0.024)
Constant -0.328(0.178)* -0.261(0.238) -0.416(0.262) -0.679(0.242)*** -0.207(0.272) -0.303(0.350) -0.234(0.189)
Observations 14,274 7,209 7,065 8,152 6,122 5,062 9,212
R-squared 0.353 0.366 0.379 0.315 0.414 0.339 0.431
Maximum Parent Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Performance in Primary or Secondary school Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 14 reports the variation in results across different sub-groups. Column (1) regresses the logarithm of hourly wage in U.S. dollars against the variables stated above, including the
mismatch variables, for the aggregate data. Column (2) through column (7) runs the similar regression as column (1) but for Females only, Males only, Workers in the informal sector, workers in
the formal sector, self-employed individuals and employees only respectively. All regressions control for the maximum parental education, performance of the individual in primary or secondary
school and the country-industry-occupation fixed effects.
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Table 15: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Earnings-Secondary and above
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Aggregate Female Male Informal Formal Self-employed Employee
USD log of Hourly earnings
Female -0.198(0.022)*** -0.293(0.038)*** -0.135(0.024)*** -0.312(0.054)*** -0.151(0.021)***
Postsecondary (specialized/vocational) -0.008(0.033) -0.003(0.047) -0.028(0.046) -0.104(0.060)* 0.096(0.035)*** -0.055(0.086) 0.028(0.032)
Bachelors (4 years) 0.146(0.038)*** 0.154(0.055)*** 0.107(0.054)* 0.020(0.073) 0.267(0.039)*** 0.041(0.102) 0.202(0.037)***
Masters 0.395(0.047)*** 0.407(0.068)*** 0.363(0.068)*** 0.270(0.090)*** 0.492(0.047)*** 0.335(0.131)** 0.430(0.044)***
Candidate of Science 0.592(0.068)*** 0.590(0.093)*** 0.536(0.111)*** 0.448(0.110)*** 0.733(0.084)*** 0.800(0.190)*** 0.540(0.068)***
Doctor of Science 0.915(0.168)*** 0.954(0.187)*** 0.686(0.309)** 0.638(0.274)** 1.143(0.201)*** 0.263(0.815) 1.046(0.151)***
Height (in meters) 0.289(0.110)*** -0.066(0.164) 0.523(0.156)*** 0.265(0.175) 0.296(0.122)** -0.004(0.258) 0.429(0.104)***
Chronic Illness -0.006(0.027) -0.018(0.037) 0.010(0.041) -0.029(0.047) -0.009(0.030) -0.008(0.064) -0.004(0.027)
Experience 0.011(0.003)*** 0.008(0.004)** 0.016(0.004)*** 0.011(0.005)** 0.012(0.003)*** 0.011(0.007) 0.010(0.003)***
Experience Squared -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)* -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)** -0.000(0.000)*** -0.000(0.000)* -0.00(0.000)0***
Informal Sector -0.258(0.024)*** -0.297(0.035)*** -0.242(0.033)*** -0.291(0.024)*** -0.237(0.024)***
Self-Employed 0.225(0.029)*** 0.239(0.045)*** 0.214(0.039)*** 0.212(0.035)*** 0.264(0.071)***
Extraversion 0.042(0.014)*** 0.057(0.021)*** 0.028(0.021) 0.050(0.024)** 0.028(0.016)* 0.075(0.034)** 0.020(0.015)
Conscientiousness 0.016(0.018) 0.032(0.026) 0.002(0.025) 0.047(0.030) -0.010(0.020) 0.039(0.043) 0.000(0.017)
Openness 0.049(0.017)*** 0.047(0.026)* 0.053(0.024)** 0.064(0.029)** 0.019(0.019) 0.043(0.041) 0.036(0.017)**
Agreeableness 0.001(0.017) -0.002(0.025) -0.000(0.022) -0.013(0.028) 0.018(0.018) 0.002(0.040) 0.002(0.017)
Emotional Stability 0.029(0.014)** 0.048(0.019)** -0.000(0.020) 0.033(0.024) 0.023(0.015) 0.003(0.034) 0.036(0.013)***
Risk Loving 0.034(0.007)*** 0.028(0.010)*** 0.041(0.010)*** 0.038(0.012)*** 0.026(0.007)*** 0.069(0.017)*** 0.018(0.007)***
Part-time Job 0.783(0.029)*** 0.777(0.038)*** 0.829(0.047)*** 0.914(0.041)*** 0.572(0.037)*** 1.021(0.056)*** 0.631(0.032)***
Over-educated -0.120(0.023)*** -0.158(0.034)*** -0.075(0.031)** -0.185(0.038)*** -0.053(0.026)** -0.228(0.053)*** -0.056(0.023)**
Under-educated 0.108(0.040)*** 0.096(0.062) 0.123(0.053)** 0.169(0.097)* 0.090(0.037)** 0.248(0.134)* 0.085(0.034)**
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.025(0.026) -0.052(0.038) -0.016(0.036) -0.030(0.053) -0.017(0.026) -0.002(0.076) -0.025(0.025)
Constant 0.131(0.216) 0.550(0.314)* -0.268(0.299) 0.117(0.354) 0.141(0.245) 1.180(0.509)** -0.081(0.212)
Observations 10,015 5,042 4,973 4,643 5,372 2,900 7,115
R-squared 0.344 0.363 0.376 0.330 0.396 0.355 0.414
Educational Field Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maximum Parent Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Performance in Primary or Secondary school Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 15 reports the variation in results across different sub-groups. Column (1) regresses the logarithm of hourly wage in U.S. dollars against the variables stated above, including the
mismatch variables, for the workers with secondary or higher level of education in the aggregate data. Column (2) through column (7) runs the similar regression as column (1) but for Females
only, Males only, Workers in the informal sector, workers in the formal sector, self-employed individuals and employees only respectively. All regressions control for the educational field,
maximum parental education, performance of the individual in primary or secondary school and the country-industry-occupation fixed effects.
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Table 16: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7))
VARIABLES Aggregate Female Male Informal Formal Self-employed Employee
Life satisfaction
USD log of Hourly earnings 0.210(0.021)*** 0.216(0.030)*** 0.214(0.031)*** 0.181(0.025)*** 0.280(0.045)*** 0.190(0.029)*** 0.221(0.034)***
Female 0.237***(0.042) 0.246(0.057)*** 0.228(0.065)*** 0.197(0.073)*** 0.250(0.052)***
Primary Education 0.047(0.121) -0.001(0.158) 0.096(0.200) 0.076(0.128) -0.224(0.467) 0.051(0.158) 0.045(0.198)
Basic General -0.030(0.112) -0.175(0.148) 0.144(0.183) 0.035(0.121) -0.266(0.430) -0.044(0.152) -0.0667(0.180)
Secondary (General) 0.008(0.115) -0.189(0.154) 0.233(0.185) 0.069(0.129) -0.205(0.425) -0.045(0.162) 0.008(0.181)
Postsecondary (specialized/vocational) 0.091(0.120) -0.061(0.163) 0.300(0.190) 0.199(0.138) -0.160(0.427) 0.064(0.174) 0.070(0.186)
Bachelors (4 years) 0.132(0.124) 0.019(0.169) 0.283(0.196) 0.151(0.148) -0.050(0.428) 0.086(0.181) 0.132(0.191)
Masters 0.441(0.136)*** 0.300(0.191) 0.627(0.209)*** 0.527(0.168)*** 0.204(0.434) 0.299(0.208) 0.502(0.202)***
Candidate of Science 0.279(0.190) 0.139(0.260) 0.500(0.295)* 0.174(0.263) 0.273(0.464) -0.612(0.431) 0.520(0.247)***
Doctor of Science -0.130(0.679) 0.699(0.658) -1.057(1.121) -0.806(1.217) 0.298(0.844) -3.202(2.132) 0.310(0.648)
Married 0.367(0.044)*** 0.350(0.059)*** 0.348(0.073)*** 0.324(0.059)*** 0.438(0.069)*** 0.277(0.076)*** 0.429(0.055)***
Has Children -0.163(0.044)*** -0.202(0.063)*** -0.123(0.066)* -0.184(0.061)*** -0.118(0.066)* -0.120(0.078) -0.189(0.054)***
Height (in meters) 0.195(0.209) 0.315(0.317) -0.125(0.292) 0.221(0.275) 0.005(0.331) 0.010(0.340) 0.220(0.270)
Chronic Illness -0.338(0.051)*** -0.297(0.069)*** -0.370(0.080)*** -0.332(0.070)*** -0.341(0.077)*** -0.336(0.086)*** -0.330(0.065)***
Age -0.082(0.012)*** -0.076(0.017)*** -0.083(0.017)*** -0.068(0.016)*** -0.109(0.018)*** -0.089(0.021)*** -0.075(0.015)***
Age squared 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)***
Extraversion 0.055(0.030)* 0.048(0.043) 0.051(0.043) 0.077(0.041)* 0.000(0.045) 0.113(0.051)** 0.026(0.038)
Conscientiousness -0.048(0.036) -0.032(0.052) -0.045(0.051) -0.076(0.049) -0.002(0.055) 0.029(0.063) -0.092(0.045)***
Openness 0.031(0.033) 0.012(0.048) 0.052(0.048) 0.003(0.044) 0.087(0.052)* -0.016(0.055) 0.061(0.042)
Agreeableness 0.192(0.032)*** 0.190(0.047)*** 0.188(0.045)*** 0.191(0.043)*** 0.179(0.047)*** 0.139(0.055)** 0.210(0.040)***
Emotional Stability 0.243(0.030)*** 0.225(0.043)*** 0.284(0.044)*** 0.29(0.041)1*** 0.175(0.044)*** 0.269(0.052)*** 0.240(0.037)***
Risk Loving 0.021(0.014) 0.014(0.021) 0.027(0.020) 0.022(0.020) 0.015(0.020) 0.060(0.026)** 0.001(0.017)
Informal Sector -0.169(0.048)*** -0.161(0.072)** -0.167(0.066)** -0.333(0.131)** -0.142(0.053)***
Self-Employed 0.214(0.049)*** 0.187(0.078)** 0.240(0.066)*** 0.182(0.057)*** 0.463(0.119)***
Part-time Job -0.291(0.050)*** -0.271(0.069)*** -0.332(0.076)*** -0.248(0.061)*** -0.279(0.091)*** -0.331(0.077)*** -0.228(0.068)***
Asset Wealth Index 0.339(0.020)*** 0.341(0.029)*** 0.333(0.029)*** 0.358(0.028)*** 0.299(0.030)*** 0.407(0.037)*** 0.301(0.024)
Over-educated -0.104(0.044)** -0.073(0.065) -0.148(0.062)** -0.103(0.060)* -0.157(0.068)** 0.012(0.076) -0.182(0.054)***
Under-educated 0.016(0.084) -0.025(0.128) 0.031(0.115) 0.050(0.130) -0.063(0.114) 0.097(0.186) 0.003(0.095)
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.102(0.068) 0.003(0.103) -0.183(0.091)** -0.103(0.107) -0.161(0.088)* -0.103(0.139) -0.112(0.078)
Constant 6.054(0.458)*** 6.352(0.654)*** 6.132(0.642)*** 5.493(0.591)*** 7.156(0.817)*** 6.644(0.772)*** 6.004(0.595)***
Observations 14,429 7,383 7,046 8,022 6,407 4,917 9,512
R-squared 0.291 0.278 0.334 0.321 0.282 0.323 0.300
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 16 reports the variation in results across different sub-groups. Column (1) regresses the life satisfaction against the variables stated above, including the mismatch variables, for the
workers in the aggregate data. Column (2) through column (7) runs the similar regression as column (1) but for Females only, Males only, Workers in the informal sector, workers in the formal
sector, self-employed individuals and employees only respectively. All regressions control for the country-industry-occupation fixed effects.
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Table 17: Education-Occupation Mismatch and Life Satisfaction-Seconadary and above
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7))
VARIABLES Aggregate Female Male Informal Formal Self-employed Employee
Life satisfaction
USD log of Hourly earnings 0.224(0.026)*** 0.202(0.038)*** 0.247(0.036)*** 0.165(0.033)*** 0.302(0.047)*** 0.176(0.039)*** 0.256(0.038)***
Female 0.266(0.049)*** 0.260(0.075)*** 0.258(0.070)*** 0.224(0.097)** 0.271(0.059)***
Postsecondary (specialized/vocational) -0.004(0.079) -0.009(0.119) 0.028(0.111) -0.112(0.121) 0.075(0.111) -0.035(0.160) 0.004(0.094)
Bachelors (4 years) 0.065(0.085) 0.091(0.127) 0.034(0.122) -0.124(0.136) 0.175(0.116) 0.018(0.171) 0.077(0.103)
Masters 0.340(0.107)*** 0.316(0.161)* 0.369(0.150)** 0.193(0.166) 0.424(0.146)*** 0.183(0.214) 0.414(0.128)***
Candidate of Science 0.200(0.167) 0.216(0.234) 0.231(0.253) -0.070(0.258) 0.473(0.217)** -0.668(0.429) 0.450(0.187)**
Doctor of Science -0.203(0.676) 0.776(0.655) -1.336(1.110) -1.052(1.197) 0.537(0.747) -3.211(2.215) 0.238(0.631)
Married 0.408(0.051)*** 0.361(0.070)*** 0.425(0.082)*** 0.372(0.077)*** 0.449(0.072)*** 0.307(0.096)*** 0.452(0.062)***
Has Children -0.154(0.051)*** -0.182(0.075)** -0.143(0.074)* -0.192(0.079)** -0.123(0.069)* -0.146(0.097) -0.160(0.061***
Height (in meters) 0.419(0.237)* 0.569(0.371) 0.071(0.328) 0.563(0.338)* 0.128(0.349) 0.723(0.440) 0.155(0.285)
Chronic Illness -0.385(0.060)*** -0.326(0.082)*** -0.435(0.093)*** -0.457(0.094)*** -0.335(0.081)*** -0.442(0.116)*** -0.360(0.072)***
Age -0.083(0.014)*** -0.068(0.021)*** -0.090(0.019)*** -0.062(0.020)*** -0.106(0.019)*** -0.070(0.027)*** -0.084(0.016)***
Age squared 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)*** 0.001(0.000)** 0.001(0.000)***
Extraversion 0.062(0.034)* 0.057(0.050) 0.061(0.048) 0.117(0.051)** -0.002(0.047) 0.180(0.064)*** 0.009(0.041)
Conscientiousness -0.055(0.042) -0.022(0.062) -0.080(0.059) -0.086(0.063) -0.010(0.058) 0.015(0.081) -0.080(0.050)
Openness 0.082(0.039)** 0.105(0.058)* 0.057(0.055) 0.050(0.058) 0.116(0.056)** 0.102(0.072) 0.077(0.048)
Agreeableness 0.210(0.037)*** 0.197(0.056)*** 0.222(0.050)*** 0.205(0.056)*** 0.196(0.050)*** 0.120(0.070)* 0.235(0.045)***
Emotional Stability 0.253(0.034)*** 0.206(0.050)*** 0.330(0.048)*** 0.345(0.051)*** 0.164(0.047)*** 0.311(0.065)*** 0.235(0.040)***
Risk Loving 0.017(0.016) 0.002(0.024) 0.032(0.022) 0.017(0.025) 0.011(0.021) 0.057(0.032)* 0.002(0.019)
Informal Sector -0.163(0.054)*** -0.185(0.082)** -0.157(0.075)** -0.327(0.145)** -0.135(0.061)**
Self-Employed 0.174(0.059)*** 0.168(0.095)* 0.187(0.077)** 0.123(0.073)* 0.394(0.125)***
Part-time Job -0.246(0.059)*** -0.195(0.082)** -0.303(0.089)*** -0.156(0.077)** -0.269(0.095)*** -0.293(0.099)*** -0.201(0.076)***
Asset Wealth Index 0.316(0.023)*** 0.327(0.034)*** 0.303(0.033)*** 0.332(0.036)*** 0.295(0.032)*** 0.361(0.048)*** 0.299(0.027)***
Over-educated -0.120(0.050)** -0.103(0.074) -0.157(0.070)** -0.148(0.074)** -0.142(0.072)** 0.024(0.096) -0.202(0.060)***
Under-educated -0.062(0.102) -0.098(0.161) -0.034(0.137) -0.260(0.183) 0.009(0.125) -0.131(0.285) -0.022(0.109)
Weak Horizontal Mismatch -0.131(0.069)* -0.041(0.107) -0.216(0.093)** -0.122(0.112) -0.171(0.090)* -0.069(0.147) -0.149(0.079)*
Constant 5.710(0.532)*** 5.733(0.778)*** 6.056(0.745)*** 5.032(0.757)*** 6.689(0.775)*** 4.768(1.020)*** 6.434(0.643)***
Observations 10,591 5,334 5,257 4,862 5,729 2,967 7,624
R-squared 0.279 0.266 0.332 0.323 0.275 0.336 0.284
Educational Field Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation-Industry-Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table 17 reports the variation in results across different sub-groups. Column (1) regresses the life satisfaction against the variables stated above, including the mismatch variables, for the
workers with secondary or higher level of education in the aggregate data. Column (2) through column (7) runs the similar regression as column (1) but for Females only, Males only, Workers in
the informal sector, workers in the formal sector, self-employed individuals and employees only respectively. All regressions control for the educational field and country-industry-occupation fixed
effects.
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